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A BROKEN WINDOWS THEORY OF 
SEXUAL ASSAULT ENFORCEMENT 
ERIN SHELEY* 
 The law of sexual assault is in conflict.  Jurisdictions struggle with the 
conceptual shift from thinking of rape as forcible sex to a broader 
understanding that turns on the meaning of consent.  Due to resource, 
evidentiary, and reporting problems there is a mismatch between the new 
substantive understanding of sexual assault and its actual enforcement.  This 
has led to something of a cultural war by survivors and many women 
generally against the idea of “rape culture,” which runs the risk of 
categorizing all sexualized or gendered speech and much of male behavior 
as implicitly rape-supportive.  This article proposes that lessons from broken 
windows policing can assist prosecutors in addressing the expressive gap 
between the law’s definition of sexual assault and the current realities of 
under-enforcement and victim disempowerment.  I suggest that enforcement 
of existing laws against the lower level street harassment of women, on the 
occasions it already meets the elements of assault or sexual assault, will 
likely have two positive effects.  First, while the efficacy of broken windows 
theory is hotly debated, to the extent that aggressive enforcement of lower 
level crimes of disorder does translate into a reduction in more serious 
offenses, more convictions for street harassment may result in a longer-term 
reduction in more serious sexual assaults that are much harder to detect and 
prove. Second, and perhaps more importantly, aggressive prosecution of 
even “harmless” non-consensual street harassment would help to resolve the 
expressive problems surrounding the law’s definition of non-consensual sex 
more broadly.  This would combat—more concretely and less divisively—the 
norm of default access to female bodies than the amorphous, extra-legal 
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INTRODUCTION 
The law of sexual assault is in an expressive crisis.  Social media has 
raised awareness of how easily even acquaintances may sexually violate a 
woman,1 and the newly-elected U.S. President is on tape endorsing it.2  At 
the same time, many jurisdictions have adopted broader definitions of sexual 
assault to match reality, shifting away from the traditional conception of rape 
 
1  See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel, Jr., Ohio Teenagers Guilty in Rape that Social Media 
Brought to Light, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/ 
us/teenagers-found-guilty-in-rape-in-steubenville-ohio.html. 
2  Penn Bullock, Transcript: Donald Trump’s Taped Comments About Women, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/us/donald-trump-tape-transcript.html. 
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as forcible sex, to one based on lack of consent.3  Yet police departments and 
prosecutors struggle with the new doctrinal shift.4  Due to resource, 
evidentiary, and reporting problems, there is a mismatch between the new 
substantive understanding of sexual assault and its actual enforcement.  This 
has contributed to something of a cultural war waged by survivors (and many 
women generally) against “rape culture.”5  While it sheds valuable light on 
the relationship between misogynistic cultural attitudes and sexual violence, 
the war on rape culture also runs the risk of indiscriminately categorizing all 
sexualized or gendered speech and much of male behavior as implicitly rape-
supportive. 
This article proposes that lessons from the so-called “Broken Windows” 
theory of policing can assist prosecutors and lawmakers in addressing the gap 
between the law’s definition of sexual assault and the current realities of 
under-enforcement and victim disempowerment.  The key hypothesis of 
Broken Windows theory is that the appearance of order gained by cracking 
down on misdemeanors will create the reality of order and reduce more 
serious violent crimes.  This claim remains controversial, even thirty years 
after Rudolph Giuliani famously relied on it to clean up the streets of New 
York City.6  Empirical scholars disagree on the theory’s efficacy and police 
have used racially suspect means to apply it.7 
Nonetheless, the interaction between appearance and reality posited by 
Broken Windows has unique explanatory power in the area of rape law.  
Inadequate sexual assault enforcement is, as I will demonstrate, a cyclical 
problem with four phases: weak cultural norms, under-enforcement, victim 
disempowerment, and underreporting.  I suggest that prosecutors, police, and 
lawmakers must aggressively target lower level street harassment of women, 
on the occasions it already meets the elements of assault.  While the instances 
where a harasser can be shown to have the intent of putting his victim in 
immediate apprehension of unwanted touching may be a minority of all 
 
3  See John F. Decker & Peter G. Baroni, Criminal Law: “No” Still Means “Yes”: The 
Failure of the “Non-Consent” Reform Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 
101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1081, 1084 (2011). 
4  See, e.g., THOMAS E. PEREZ & MICHAEL W. COTTER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RE: THE 
UNITED STATES’ INVESTIGATION OF THE MISSOULA POLICE DEPARTMENT 6 (May 15, 2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/05/22/missoulapdfind_5-15-
13.pdf.  
5  See Emilie Buchwald et al., Are We Really Living in a Rape Culture?, in TRANSFORMING 
RAPE CULTURE vii (Emilie Buchwald et al. eds., 1993). 
6  See George L. Kelling, How New York Became Safe: The Full Story, CITY J. (SPECIAL 
ISSUE) (2009), http://www.city-journal.org/html/how-new-york-became-safe-full-story-
13197.html. 
7  See infra Section II.A and accompanying footnotes. 
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harassment cases generally, they are frequent enough that the state can send 
an important expressive message by prosecuting them as simple assault or 
other related offenses. 
This should have two positive effects. First, if the proponents of the 
strong view of Broken Windows are correct that enforcing lower level laws 
does reduce more serious offenses, then punishing street harassment may, 
over the long term, reduce the more serious sexual assaults that are much 
harder to detect and prove.  Second, if the critics of Broken Windows are 
right—if all we get from Broken Windows policing are fewer “broken 
windows”—that would still be uniquely beneficial in the context of sexual 
assault due to the high symbolic value of street harassment.  Aggressive 
prosecution of even “harmless” non-consensual street harassment would help 
resolve the law’s broader expressive problem with categorizing non-
consensual sex.  Even if it did not directly deter serious sexual assault, it 
would help combat the norm of default access to female bodies more 
concretely and less divisively than the amorphous, extra-legal critique of 
“rape culture” has thus far.  It would also encourage victims to report more 
serious offenses by showing that the state cares about prosecuting them.  All 
of these effects would serve, indirectly, to reduce the incidence of sexual 
assault. 
This article will proceed in five parts. In Part I, I identify and explain 
the cyclical relationship between the appearance and reality of states under-
enforcing the sexual assault laws.  In Part II, I introduce Broken Windows 
theory and its critics and propose a framework for evaluating its efficacy in 
the context of sexual assault.  In Part III, I describe the problem of street 
harassment and the harms it causes and suggest its sociological and legal 
relationship to sexual assault.  In Part IV, I argue that Broken Windows 
theory holds promise for sexual assault enforcement and propose that 
prosecutors prioritize charges against street harassers in order to improve 
their inadequate enforcement of sexual assault laws.  I also consider 
counterarguments.  In Part V, I conclude. 
I.  THE RAPE CYCLE 
It has become something of a truism that rape is under-reported and 
under-prosecuted.  This section reviews the various data on these claims and 
explores the problems contributed by doctrinal confusion over the definition 
of rape and cultural mythologies about sex and gender.  It concludes that the 
appearance of under-enforcement has contributed to under-reporting, and 
that the resulting expressive crisis has had a negative impact on relevant 
cultural norms—which have in turn contributed to under-enforcement in a 
kind of vicious cycle. 
SHELEY 6/5/18  1:52 PM 
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A. UNDER-ENFORCEMENT 
In 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) issued findings following 
its investigation of the Missoula, Montana Police Department (MPD) for 
under-enforcement of the law in cases of sexual violence.8  Operating under 
the authority granted by 42 U.S.C. § 14141—allowing the federal 
government to bring suit against unconstitutional patterns of policing—the 
DOJ targeted the MPD after a series of local news reports detailed its 
systemic law enforcement failure when it came to sex crimes.9  The DOJ 
identified MPD policies such as “discouraging female victims of sexual 
assault from cooperating with law enforcement” due, in part, to “stereotypes 
and misinformation about women and victims of sexual assault.”10  The 
report concluded that the MPD’s systematic under-enforcement of the sexual 
assault laws, particularly in cases of non-stranger rape, constituted a violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.11 
The DOJ noted that victims may have been routinely deterred from 
seeking prosecution by being asked at the outset whether they wished to 
proceed criminally.  “Such a question,” the report noted,  
may send the message that if she proceeds with her case she will be expected to be the 
driving force behind the prosecution; that she should already feel sufficiently well-
informed and empowered to make the decision as to whether to seek prosecution; or 
that she should feel personally responsible for imposing serious criminal consequences 
on the assailant.12  
Furthermore, the report noted that the MPD failed to employ certain 
techniques relevant to proving the crucial element of lack of consent in 
alcohol-facilitated assaults.13  Such omissions included collecting evidence, 
interviewing witnesses, and questioning suspects.14  Eventually, the MPD 
 
8  See generally PEREZ & COTTER, supra note 4.  
9  See, e.g., Gwen Florio, Student Says She was Sexually Assaulted by UM Football 
Players; County Filed No Charges, MISSOULIAN  (Dec. 21, 2011), http://missoulian.com/ 
news/local/student-says-she-was-sexually-assaulted-by-um-football-players/article_ 
5fd79f90-2b8f-11e1-a73a-0019bb2963f4.html; Gwen Florio, Missoula Police: 2nd Attack 
May Be Linked to Alleged Sex Assault Involving UM Football Players, MISSOULIAN (Dec. 20, 
2011), http://missoulian.com/news/local/missoula-police-nd-attack-may-be-linked-to-alle 
ged-sex/article_d261cb6e-2aca-11e1-9033-0019bb2963f4.html; Gwen Florio¸ 3 UM Football 
Players Allegedly Involved in Sexual Assault on Campus, MISSOULIAN (Dec. 16, 2011), 
http://missoulian.com/news/local/um-football-players-allegedly-involved-in-sexual-assault-
on-campus/article_265fbee2-27a6-11e1-8834-0019bb2963f4.html. 
10  PEREZ & COTTER, supra note 4, at 6. 
11  Id. 
12  Id. at 8–9. 
13  Id. at 7.  
14  Id. at 8. 
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settled with the government and agreed to modify its policies to implement 
best practices to combat gender bias consistent with the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) Model Policy on Investigating Sexual 
Assaults.15 
As a vindication of the Equal Protection Clause’s promise of gender-
neutral state law enforcement protection, the Missoula settlement has been 
heralded as coming “as close as any intervention since Reconstruction to 
addressing the framers’ core concern with underenforcement.”16  It is, 
however, only a very early inroad into a problem that has become a truism in 
criminal justice circles: most victims fail to report sexual assaults.17  The DOJ 
estimates that, among eighteen to twenty-four-year-old women, only 20% of 
college students and 32% of non-college students report these crimes.18  Of 
those numbers, one in five of the non-college students surveyed stated that 
they did not report because they believed that “police would or could not do 
anything to help.”19 
While these bleak numbers have been controversial, they are consistent 
with other literature on sexual assault investigations around the country, 
which reveal a pervasive failure of law enforcement and prosecutors’ offices 
to pursue reported sexual assaults.20  Empirical literature suggests that 
 
15  Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Department of Justice and 
the City of Missoula Regarding the Missoula Police Department’s Response to Sexual Assault 
1–4 (May 13, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2013/05/15/ 
missoulapdsettle_5-15-13.pdf. 
16  Deborah Tuerkheimer, Underenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 
1287, 1287 (2016). 
17  See, e.g., Patricia Tjaden & Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of 
Rape Victimization: Findings from the National Violence Against Women Survey, NAT’L INST. 
JUST. 34 (Oct. 24, 2013) (finding that 80.9% of rape survivors do not report their assault to the 
police).  
18  See SOFI SINOZICH & LYNN LANGTON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT 
VICTIMIZATION AMONG COLLEGE-AGE FEMALES, 1995–2013 1, 5 (2014), https://www.bjs. 
gov/content/pub/pdf/rsavcaf9513.pdf. 
19  Id. at 9. 
20  See, e.g., CASSIA SPOHN & KATHARINE TELLIS, NAT’L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV., 
POLICING AND PROSECUTING SEXUAL ASSAULT IN LOS ANGELES CITY AND COUNTY: A 
COLLABORATIVE STUDY IN PARTNERSHIP WITH THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, THE 
LOS ANGELES COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, AND THE LOS ANGELES COUNTY DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY’S OFFICE (2012); Justin Fenton, City Rape Statistics, Investigations Draw Concern, 
BALT. SUN (June 27, 2010), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/bs-md-ci-rapes-20100519-
story.html (reporting that the police investigated only four out of ten emergency rape calls 
between the years 2003–2010); Jeremy Kohler, What Rape?: Abused by the System, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 28, 2005), http://dartcenter.org/content/what-rape; Todd Lighty et al., 
Few Arrests, Convictions in Campus Sexual Assault Cases, CHI. TRIB. (June 16, 2011), 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-06-16/news/ct-met-campus-sexual-assaults-0617-
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prosecutors are more likely to see rape cases as “winnable” when they fit the 
model of so-called “real rape” (for example, when the assailant used a 
weapon or there was at least evidence of use of force).21  Furthermore, juries 
are four times more likely to convict when a sexual assault involves factors 
such as stranger assailants, multiple assailants, or violence.22  While some of 
that disparity may be explained on purely evidentiary grounds—cases of 
violent rape generally leave more physical evidence and make intentionality 
easier to prove—the evidence suggests that judges and juries reach 
disproportionately divergent conclusions in non-aggravated sexual assault 
cases.23  According to Kalven and Zeisel’s landmark study of the American 
jury, in 88% of aggravated sexual assault cases, judges and juries reach the 
same verdict of guilty; yet, they agree only 40% of the time in other sexual 
assault cases.24  In other words, in cases where women could be perceived as 
in some way contributing to their victimization, judges found guilt but juries 
did not.25 
It should be noted that there are many reasons other than gender 
stereotypes that could explain why law enforcement may fail to pursue these 
cases.  One is the now-famous “rape kit backlog,” which currently thwarts 
the potential discovery of DNA evidence in approximately 400,000 cases 
across the country.26  According to a recent National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 
study, 18% of the unsolved alleged sexual assaults occurring from 2002–
2007 involved forensic evidence collected but never submitted for DNA 
analysis.27  Clearly, given the centrality of DNA evidence to proof of sexual 
assault, more funding for police departments and crime labs would improve 
the clearance rates for sex offenses. 
That said, Congress has addressed the public indignation over the rape 
kit backlog with funds.  In 2004, it enacted the Debbie Smith Act (which was 
 
20110616_1_convictions-arrests-assault-cases; The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, 
RAINN, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system (analyzing FBI data to 
conclude that of every 310 reported rapes only fifty-seven lead to an arrest).  For a more 
detailed review of this literature, see Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 1294–96.  
21  See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 18–19 (1987); Wayne A. Kerstetter, Gateway to 
Justice: Police and Prosecutorial Response to Sexual Assaults Against Women, 81 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 267, 301, 305 (1990). 
22  HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 252–53 (1971). 
23  Id. at 253. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. at 252 n.14.  
26  Caitlin Dickson, How the U.S. Ended up With 400,000 Untested Rape Kits, DAILY 
BEAST (Sept. 23, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/09/23/how-the-u-s-
ended-up-with-400-000-untested-rape-kits.html. 
27  NANCY RITTER, THE ROAD AHEAD: UNANALYZED EVIDENCE IN SEXUAL ABUSE CASES, 
NAT’L INST. OF JUST. 1 (May 2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/233279.pdf.  
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reauthorized in 2008 and 2014), allocating funds for states to test DNA 
samples and crime scene analysis, as well as to incorporate DNA analysis 
into state databases linked to the National DNA Index System.28  
Furthermore, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013 
incorporated the Sexual Assault Forensic Evidence Registry (SAFER) Act, 
which created incentives for local jurisdictions to audit their rape kit backlog 
and hire new staff to process it.29  Despite these federal efforts, only 
seventeen states have introduced measures to address their backlogs.30  As 
Deborah Tuerkheimer has noted of a recent Detroit study: 
Contrary to conventional wisdom, police officers repeatedly indicated that the failure 
to submit a rape kit for testing was indicative of a decision not to pursue the case, rather 
than a decision to pursue it without additional corroboration.  Put differently, the kits 
were shelved because the allegations had already been disregarded.31 
At the very least there seems to be some evidence of state entities de-
prioritizing the pursuit of sexual assault allegations, particularly those lacking 
evidence of obvious violence. 
B. DEFINITIONAL AND EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS 
The most fundamental evidentiary problems at the heart of sexual 
assault enforcement may relate less to flawed police practices than to the 
substantive definition of sexual assault.  The ambiguity of what constitutes a 
sexual assault—coupled with the classic he said/she said credibility choice at 
the heart of many non-stranger rape fact patterns—has been challenging for 
prosecutors. 
At common law, “force” was an element of rape, meaning that the state 
needed to show that the accused had had “carnal knowledge of a woman 
forcibly and against her will.”32  That requirement remains the touchstone of 
the law in sixteen of the U.S. states requiring a showing of “forcible 
compulsion” or at least “incapacity to consent.”33  However over time, more 
 
28  42 U.S.C. § 13701 (2012). 
29  Pub. L. No. 113–4, 127 Stat. 54 (Mar. 7, 2013). 
30  See Graceann Carimico et al., Rape and Sexual Assault, 17 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 359, 
368 (2016) (citing Soraya Chemaly, How Many of the Hundreds of Thousands of Untested 
Rape Kits in the US Are in Your City?, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 19, 2014), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/soraya-chemaly/how-many-of-the-uss-40000_b_5845052. 
html). 
31  Tuerkheimer, supra note 16, at 1296–97 (citing REBECCA CAMPBELL ET AL, NAT’L 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., THE DETROIT SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT (SAK) ACTION 
RESEARCH PROJECT (ARP) FINAL REPORT 121 (2015)).  
32  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 210 (1765).  
33  Decker & Baroni, supra note 3, at 1085–86.  Massachusetts is the sole state of that 
number specifically requiring compulsion.  Id. at 1086.  
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and more states began to adopt a definition of sexual assault based on the 
victim’s lack of consent, as opposed to the defendant’s show of force.  John 
Decker and Peter Baroni provide a useful taxonomy of these developing new 
standards.34  The twenty-eight “true non-consent states” have at least one sex 
offense on the books that can be proven by showing that the victim did not 
consent to the sexual act.35  Of these, seventeen have non-consent provisions 
for sexual penetration offenses, while the other eleven have non-consent 
provisions for offenses involving sexual contact with the victim’s intimate 
parts.36  Nine “contradictory non-consent states” have laws drafted to suggest 
that the elements of a sex offense statute are met when a victim does not 
affirmatively consent to the act.37  As Decker and Baroni point out, though, 
these states define “consent” in such a way that negates the purpose of 
requiring affirmative consent: “To establish a ‘lack of consent’ in 
contradictory states, the prosecution must show either the use of forcible 
compulsion or a victim’s incapacity to consent.  Requiring force or a lack of 
capacity to consent completely negates the purpose of including a non-
consent provision.”38 
Commentators have criticized the status quo for failing to criminalize 
pure non-consensual sex across the board.39  As Decker and Baroni put it, 
“[a] victim, frozen with fear, who fails to express approval by words or 
actions should have that decision protected by the criminal justice system.”40 
They also criticize the lack of criminal sanction for those who obtain sex 
through deception, at least where there is a specific intent to achieve the sex.41 
In contrast, Donald Dripps fears that shifting the standard away from the 
force requirement and towards consent will fail as a pragmatic matter.42  He 
argues that juries will never appropriately apply the consent standard in fact 
due to tension between “elite opinion,” which values sexual autonomy and 
condemns sexual aggression, and “popular opinion,” which supposes that 
 
34  Id. 
35  Id. at 1084. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. at 1085. 
38  Id.  
39  The Criminal Code of Canada, for example, does not allow the defense of honest but 
mistaken belief in consent unless the accused has taken “reasonable steps” to ascertain that the 
complainant was consenting.  C.C.C. Sec. 273.2 
40  Decker & Baroni, supra note 3, at 1167. 
41  Id.  As Robin West points out, this would constitute fraud in most other contexts.  Robin 
West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 
1443 (1993). 
42  Donald Dripps, After Rape Law: Will the Turn to Consent Normalize the Prosecution 
of Sexual Assault?, 41 AKRON L. REV. 957 (2008). 
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sexual autonomy “may be forfeited by female promiscuity or flirtation, and 
views male sexual aggression as natural, if not indeed admirable.”43  As he 
puts it: 
A number of factors are at work.  One, probably more prominent than academic 
observers may realize, is the tremendous caseload pressure throughout the system.  Sex 
crimes units struggle just to process the aggravated cases; until they have more 
resources than aggravated cases, only the aggravated cases will be charged.  Another is 
very likely prosecutorial perception of juror prejudice.  If prosecutors have a tough time 
winning convictions in the aggravated cases, why should they reach for cases in which 
guilty verdicts are even more unlikely?44 
Evidence suggests that prosecutorial discretion based on anticipated 
juror bias has indeed served to undermine legislative messaging in the 
somewhat analogous context of hate crime laws.45  According to one recent 
study, prosecutors expressed concern about including hate crime charges 
because “it might complicate the issues of the case before a jury” as well as 
the fact of “the political landscape of their jurisdiction as a reason not to 
include hate crime charges.”46 
Of course, even assuming infinite prosecutorial resources, substantive 
standards of affirmative consent, and non-biased juries, many, if not most, of 
sexual assault cases pose evidentiary problems at the level of the individual 
facts.47  Cases of forcible rape, where the primary issue at trial is generally 
identity, are among the most frequently overturned as a result of DNA re-
testing.48  In cases of acquaintance rape, however, the issue is often consent, 
which invariably (and necessarily) boils down to a credibility contest 
between the defendant and the victim.49 
Legislative initiatives such as “rape shield” laws,50 which prohibit use 
of a victim’s prior sexual history to prove her likelihood of consent, and 
exceptions to the general ban on “propensity” evidence in order to admit a 
defendant’s prior sexual misconduct,51 look to improve the prosecution’s 
 
43  Id. at 958.  Dripps concludes that the disconnect between popular opinion and law urges 
that prosecutors try close cases before judges, even if that constitutionally limits them to 
seeking only six-month prison terms.  
44  Id. at 975. 
45  Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 893–95 (2014). 
46  Id. at 893–94.  
47  See generally Aviva Orenstein, Special Issues Raised by Rape Trials, 76 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1585 (2007). 
48  Id. at 1591.  
49  See Deborah Tuerkheimer, He Said, She Said, MS. BLOG (Apr. 27, 2017), 
http://msmagazine.com/blog/2017/04/27/he-said-she-said/. 
50  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412. 
51  See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 413. 
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chances of proving consent in these cases.  Yet, in cases that boil down to a 
straightforward he-said/she-said conflict where both parties appear credible, 
the defendant must get the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard unless we 
agree to ignore the Constitution altogether.52 
In short: at the adjudicatory level—much like the investigatory level—
sexual assault prosecutions face both substantive and procedural obstacles.  
In the next two Sections, I will consider how these legal obstacles 
reciprocally impact cultural discourses about sexual assault and consent.  The 
dialogue creates unfortunate expressive consequences for the criminal justice 
system’s messaging about women’s sexual dignity. 
C. RAPE CULTURE: SOCIAL NORMS SHAPING LEGAL NORMS 
Legal change, of course, does not happen in isolation, but through a 
dialectical exchange with culture.53  Changing cultural norms about right and 
wrong affect lawmakers and enforcers, and new legal norms can shape 
cultural norms in return, though rarely in a perfect, one-for-one exchange.54  
Since the 1970’s, feminist scholars have identified the social phenomenon of 
“rape culture” as a negative influence on the reporting, prosecution, and 
conviction of sexual assailants.55 “Rape culture” is the belief system 
 
52  As I will discuss in Section I.C, infra, the trend in college administrative proceedings 
has been to implement a preponderance of the evidence standard on the issue of consent, which 
has drawn criticism and litigation.  See Conor Friedersdorf, What Should the Standard of Proof 
Be in College Rape Cases?, ATLANTIC (June 17, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/ 
politics/archive/2016/06/campuses-sexual-misconduct/487505/.  Some observers urge a lower 
standard of proof even in criminal proceedings.  Rei, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt: Applying 
The Wrong Legal Standard To Establishing Consent in Rape Cases, DAILY KOS (June 19, 
2013), http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/6/19/1217232/-Beyond-The-Shadow-of-a-
Doubt-Applying-The-Wrong-Legal-Standard-To-Establishing-Consent-in-Rape-Case. The 
Constitutional question is beyond the scope of this article, which takes as a starting point that 
the rule of law requires the same standard of proof apply to all defendants, regardless of 
offense. 
53  An example is the use of municipal “pooper scooper” ordinances to change social norms 
about cleaning up after dogs.  See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex 
Economy: The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144  U. PA. L. 
REV. 1643, 1675 (1996). 
54  See Amir N. Licht, Social Norms and the Law: Why Peoples Obey the Law, 4 REV. OF 
L. & ECON. 715, 716–18 (2008) (reviewing the literature on the relationship between law and 
norms). 
55  See, e.g., SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 389 
(1975); Buchwald et al., supra note 5, at vii; Martha R. Burt, Cultural Myths and Supports for 
Rape, 38 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 217, 229 (1980); Kimberly A. Lonsway & Louise 
F. Fitzgerald, Rape Myths: In Review, 18 PSYCHOL. WOMEN. Q. 133, 136–37 (1994); Patricia 
Novotny, Rape Victims in the (Gender) Neutral Zone: The Assimilation of Resistance?, 1 
SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 743, 745 n.15 (2003); Vicki NcNickle Rose, Rape as a Social Problem: 
A Byproduct of the Feminist Movement, 25 SOC. PROBS. 75, 78 (1977) (“From the feminist 
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encouraging and legitimizing male sexual aggression against women.56  The 
key features of rape culture include dominant-submissive stereotypes of 
male-female sex roles, the perpetuation of so-called “rape myths,” and a 
“framework that blames sexual assault on the actions of the victim rather than 
questioning the behavior of the rapist.”57 
Psychologist Diana Payne has identified seven key myths supporting 
rape culture: 1) “She asked for it” (in particular by being drunk); 2) “It wasn’t 
really rape” (in the absence of physical injury); 3) “He didn’t mean to” 
(because he was too aroused to notice she wasn’t consenting); 4) “She wanted 
it” (because women have rape fantasies); 5) “She lied” (because she 
consented but then changed her mind afterward); 6) “Rape is a trivial event” 
(and women exaggerate its emotional effects); and 7) “Rape is a deviant 
event” (because rarely are women raped by their own partners).58  These 
myths were embodied in the long-lived common law evidentiary rules about 
rape that required proof of force, admitted the complainant’s sexual history 
as relevant to both consent and credibility, and failed to recognize marital 
rape at all.59 
While these formal rules have changed over time, through both statute 
and case law,60 such myths continue to animate our society and our legal 
 
perspective, rape is a direct result of our culture’s differential sex role socialization and sexual 
stratification.”); see generally Meagan Hildebrand & Cynthia J. Najdowski, The Potential 
Impact of Rape Culture on Juror Decision Making: Implications for Wrongful Acquittals in 
Sexual Assault Trials, 78 ALBANY L. REV. 1059 (2015). 
56  Hildebrand & Najdowski, supra note 55, at 1060. 
57  Id. at 1062. 
58  Diana L. Payne et al., Rape Myth Acceptance: Exploration of Its Structure and Its 
Measurement Using the Illinois Rape Myth Acceptance Scale, 33 J. RES. PERSONALITY 27, 59 
(1999). 
59  The proof of force was a long-standing requirement under the common law for reasons 
typified by Victorian gynecologist Lawson Tait, who observed, “I am perfectly satisfied that 
no man can effect a felonious purpose on a woman in possession of her senses without her 
consent” because, after all, “you cannot thread a moving needle.”  SUSAN S.M. EDWARDS, 
FEMALE SEXUALITY AND THE LAW 122–26 (1981).  As to the relevance of prior sexual history 
to consent, a nineteenth century American court once asked, “will you not more readily infer 
assent in the practiced Messalina, in loose attire, than in the reserved and virtuous Lucretia?”  
People v. Abbott, 19 Wend. 192 (N.Y. 1838).  On the relevance to credibility, it was “a matter 
of common knowledge that the bad character of a man for chastity does not even in the 
remotest degree affect his character for truth, when based upon that alone, while it does that 
of a woman.”  State v. Sibley, 131 Mo. 519 (Mo. 1895). 
60  While, as described in Section I.B, supra, the shift from force to consent is still in 
progress in the U.S., two English cases, Regina v. Camplin, 1 Cox C.C. 220 (1845), and Regina 
v. Fletcher, 8 Cox C.C. 131 (1859), began to shift the law toward the consent model far earlier.  
In Camplin, the court upheld the defendant’s conviction for having sex with an insensible 
thirteen-year-old after he had given her alcohol “in order to excite her.”  1 Cox. CC at 220.  In 
Fletcher, the victim was a developmentally disabled girl who had not resisted the defendant’s 
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system.  Studies have shown support for the beliefs that women who do not 
wear bras or do wear short skirts are “asking for trouble,” as well as for the 
belief that going to a man’s home with him suggests the desire to consent to 
sex.61  Furthermore, laypeople, police officers, rape crisis counselors, and 
rapists have been found to support fourteen out of thirty-two rape myths, such 
as the idea that a woman should feel guilty after being raped and that the 
victim should be responsible for physical resistance.62  Indeed, laypeople, 
police officers, and counselors were even more likely than rapists themselves 
to believe that women help bring about rape through appearance or behavior, 
and that they should physically resist their attackers.63  This last data point is 
consistent with the DOJ’s findings about the Missoula Police Department 
discussed above in Section I.A. 
Hildebrand and Najdowski have posited a psychological model through 
which the prevalence of such rape myths may affect jury decision-making in 
rape trials.64  They point to the evidence that knowledge is structured 
according to cognitive schemas and scripts, and hypothesize that “jurors’ 
scripts for sexual assault are based on the cultural ‘real rape’ narrative” such 
that: 
when a woman alleging sexual assault behaved in ways that are inconsistent with the 
‘real rape’ script (e.g., she was drinking prior to the assault, she did not physically fight 
her attacker, she did not report the assault immediately) or men’s behavior is legitimized 
by cultural norms (e.g., expectations about what happens when a woman goes home 
with a man), jurors may be less likely to believe that a sexual assault occurred.65 
The authors also suggest that this tendency will be exacerbated by 
confirmation bias—the process of seeking out information consistent with 
 
advances.  In upholding his conviction, the court said: 
The question is, what is the proper definition of the crime of rape?  Is it carnal 
knowledge of a prosecutrix?  If it must be against her will, then the crime was not proved 
in this case; but if the offence is complete where it was by force and without her consent, 
then the offence proved that was charged in the indictment, and the prisoner was 
properly convicted . . . .  It would be monstrous to say that these poor females are to be 
subjected to such violence, without the parties inflicting it being liable to be indicted.  
If so, every drunken woman returning from market, and happening to fall down on the 
road side, may be ravished at the will of the passers by.   
Fletcher, 8 Cox C.C. at 134. 
Rape shield laws have, as also discussed in Section I.B, supra, served as a statutory fix for the 
rape myths of the “unchaste” woman. 
61  Burt, supra note 55, at 223. 
62  Hubert S. Field, Attitudes Toward Rape: A Comparative Analysis of Police, Rapists, 
Crisis Counselors, and Citizens, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 156, 160, 168 (1978). 
63  Id. at 170. 
64  Hildebrand & Najdowski, supra note 55, at 1073. 
65  Id. 
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pre-conceived scripts and disregarding other inconsistent information.66  
They conclude that rape culture, through its effects on the types of schemas 
and scripts that jurors rely on in sexual assault trials, and the resulting 
confirmation bias and selective evidence processing, affects the ways jurors 
assign responsibility to victims and defendants.67 
But where does rape culture come from in the first place?  Many scholars 
agree that it is socially contingent, rather than purely organic.68  Catharine 
MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin famously critiqued pornography for 
contributing to the problem by presenting women as “sexual objects 
experiencing sexual pleasure in rape, incest[,] or other sexual assault” and 
“dehumanized as sexual objects, things, or commodities.”69  Beyond actual 
pornography, theorists often point the finger at media and pop culture—at 
music lyrics, television, advertisements, and social media—which 
communicate rape myths and objectified portrayals of women.70  For 
example, many critics flag the lyrics of the Robin Thicke song “Blurred 
Lines” as a particularly clear example of this phenomenon: “I hate these 
blurred lines, I know you want it . . . but you’re a good girl, the way you grab 
me, must wanna get nasty.”71  Thicke describes as “blurry” the perceived 
contrast between a woman’s stated lack of consent and the “secret” desire for 
sex despite herself.72  Notably, the song captured the top spot on Billboard’s 
2013 Songs of the Summer chart.73 
In another recent example, the HBO television show Game of Thrones, 
based on the George R.R. Martin epic fantasy series, A Song of Ice and Fire, 
has drawn heavy criticism for its portrayal of sexual violence against 
women.74  While we, as viewers, are intended to view most of the show’s 
 
66  Id. at 1074. 
67  Id. at 1077–78. 
68  See Buchwald et al., supra note 5, at vii. 
69  CATHARINE MACKINNON & ANDREA DWORKIN, IN HARM’S WAY: THE PORNOGRAPHY 
CIVIL RIGHTS HEARINGS 428 (1997). 
70  Hildebrand & Najdowski, supra note 55, at 1066–67  (citing Monique Ward et al., 
Breasts are for Men: Media, Masculinity Ideologies, and Men’s Beliefs About Women’s 
Bodies, 55 SEX ROLES 703, 705 (2006); Nicola Henry & Anastasia Powell, The Dark Side of 
the Visual World: Towards a Digital Sexual Ethics, in PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE: 
INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACHES TO OVERCOMING A RAPE CULTURE 84, 90–91 (Nicola Henry 
& Anastasia Powell eds., 2014). 
71  Hildebrand & Najdowski, supra note 55, at 1067.  
72  Id. 
73  Gary Trust, Robin Thicke’s “Blurred Lines” is the Song of the Summer, BILLBOARD 
(Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.billboard.com/articles/news/5687036/robin-thickes-blurred-lines-
is-billboards-song-of-the-summer.  
74  See Oliver Noble, All the Sex and Nudity in ‘Game of Thrones’ Season 6, HUFFINGTON 
POST (last visited Oct. 5 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/all-the-sex-and-nudity-
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sexual perpetrators as evil, and the violence is realistic to the brutal medieval 
world the series portrays, one particular scene from the series’ fourth season 
attracted critical ire.  In it, Jaime Lannister—a corrupt but often sympathetic 
character—comforts his sister over the coffin of the child of their incest.  Out 
of nowhere (and inaccurately to the parallel scene in the book) Jaime 
suddenly growls “you’re a hateful woman; why have the Gods made me love 
a hateful woman?” and proceeds to rape her over her protests.75 
In a press conference on the matter, Dawn Hawkins, executive director 
of the National Center on Sexual Exploitation, accused HBO of bringing “the 
ambiance of torture pornography into American living rooms through Game 
of Thrones’ explicit depictions of rape, incest, prostitution, and sexual 
violence” and urged that “[t]his cocktail of pornography and twisted plot 
lines must be denounced as socially irresponsible, especially in an age when 
American society is struggling to combat the crises of sexual assault and rape 
culture.”76  Yet other commentators have noted that Game of Thrones can 
actually be read as a feminist text, due to its depictions of precisely the female 
perspectives that are often silenced.77  In this view, while the show may 
replicate discourses of masculinity that contribute to “rape culture,” it also—
particularly as supplemented by feminist discourse in online fan 
communities—provides “a potential space for change through speaking out 
about silenced experiences of trauma.”78 
Game of Thrones is just one example of how social media has shaped 
feminist discourse about rape culture, providing a space for women to 
publicly identify examples and discuss them.  This function is particularly 
important when, as discussed in Part I, one of the obstacles to proper 
enforcement is the culturally contested and legally unstable definition of rape 
itself.  Two recent, high-profile examples are former Stanford swimmer 
Brock Turner’s victim’s widely-circulated account of experiencing the 
aftermath of sexual assault while unconscious,79 and the commentary on the 
 
in-season-6-of-game-of-thrones_us_5772c998e4b0eb90355c8a05; see generally VALERIE 
ESTELLE FRANKEL, WOMEN IN GAME OF THRONES: POWER, CONFORMITY AND RESISTANCE 
(2014). 
75  Game of Thrones: Breaker of Chains (HBO television broadcast Apr. 20, 2014). 
76  Joe Otterson, ‘Game of Thrones’ Accused of Promoting Rape Culture, ‘Torture 
Pornography,’ WRAP (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.thewrap.com/game-of-thrones-accused-of-
promoting-rape-culture-torture-pornography/. 
77  See FRANKEL, supra note 74, at 2. 
78  Debra Ferreday, Game of Thrones, Rape Culture and Feminist Fandom, 30 
AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST STUDIES 21, 21 (2015). 
79  See Erin Sheley, Victim Impact Statements and Expressive Punishment in the Age of 
Social Media, 52 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 157 (2017), for an account of the significance of the 
Stanford victim impact statement in the context of expressive punishment. 
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light sentences of Steubenville, Ohio high-school football players Ma’lik 
Richmond and Tyler Mays for the video-recorded rape of a sixteen-year-old 
girl, during which one of the assailants observed that “some people deserve 
to be peed on.”80  As to the latter, it has been said that “social media won the 
Steubenville case,”81 after crime blogger Alexandria Goddard compiled 
screen shots of Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter posts as evidence of the 
assault.82 
Cultural theorists praise social media as a forum for witnessing 
testimony and critique about rape culture and its effects.  As Carrie 
Rentschler puts it, “[f]eminist responses to rape culture transform notions of 
witnessing, moving from conceptions of witnessing as a sensory-based act of 
seeing or hearing to the ability to record and distribute audio-visual evidence 
of rape culture.”83  Both the Stanford and Steubenville cases make explicit 
not only the relationship between culture and violence, but also between 
cultural commentary and the construction of legal truth: culture may indeed 
help normalize sexual violence against women, but it can also cast light on 
reality in a way that may ultimately affect legal decision-making.  In 
particular, it has been useful in publicly redefining as rape non-consensual 
sexual behavior that had previously been tolerated, or at least not spoken 
about. 
That said, despite the importance of recognizing rape culture’s effect of 
diminishing rapists’ accountability, it is dangerous to use the term as a 
blanket critique of much of male behavior generally.  Rape is a legal term.  
To use it effectively to assign the stigma of criminal accountability where it 
belongs, “rape” must be susceptible to a precise definition.  While the myth 
that limits the definition of rape to circumstances of violent, stranger rape has 
demonstrably contributed to the under-reporting and under-enforcement 
 
80  Juliet Macur & Nate Schweber, Rape Case Unfolds on Web and Splits City, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/17/sports/high-school-football-rape-case-
unfolds-online-and-divides-steubenville-ohio.html. 
81  Adam Cohen, Steubenville Rape Guilty Verdict: The Case That Social Media Won, 
TIME (Mar. 17, 2013), http://ideas.time.com/2013/03/17/steubenville-rape-guilty-verdict-the-
case-that-social-media-won/. 
82  Carrie A. Rentschler, Rape Culture and the Feminist Politics of Social Media, 7 
GIRLHOOD STUD. 65, 65–66 (2014). 
83  Id. at 69.  The same power exists in traditional literature. See, e.g., Leone Sandra 
Hankey, Women Write Patriarchal Wrongs: Narrative Resistance to the Rape Culture, in 
BEYOND PORTIA: WOMEN, LAW AND LITERATURE IN THE UNITED STATES 205 (Jacqueline St. 
Joan & Annette Bennington McElhiney eds., 1997) (giving, as an example, Joanna Russ’s 
science fiction novel The Female Man, which “shows the effectiveness of going outside legal 
discourse and using the tools of plainspeak, parody, and ridicule to reveal the irrationality and 
viciousness of the way raped women are treated”). 
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crises,84 there are also grave risks should the only alternative narrative be 
overly broad. 
The discourse of rape culture raises particular problems through its 
construction of women as victims.  Aya Gruber criticizes the theory of rape 
culture for perpetuating, to an unhealthy degree, what she terms the “trauma 
narrative” of rape in the context of campus sex.85  The trauma narrative is 
“rife with other risks, including bureaucratic management of students 
stripped of their subjectivity and speech restrictions” and “construes sexual 
assault complainants as devastated (or self-deluding) and female students as 
incapable of self-management.”86  In short, she fears, “anti-rape culture 
repackages feminist energy and female empowerment as sexual 
victimhood.”87  She also notes the dangers of widespread silence around the 
topic of rape, epitomized by the increasing calls for “trigger warnings” to 
avoid potentially traumatizing rape victims.88 
Commentators who overuse the notion of “rape culture” run the risk of 
constructing the victim as perpetually fragile and unable to escape a 
subordinating cultural context.  This notion shares disturbing commonalities 
with precisely the patriarchal culture it opposes.  Indeed, through a 
comparative analysis of contemporary American culture with patriarchal 
Puritan culture, Bryden and Madore conclude that patriarchal culture—
traditionally cited as a pre-condition to rape culture—was in fact less rape 
supportive than contemporary egalitarian culture.89  The authors do not 
endorse a return to Puritan culture, nor a shift in enforcement focus away 
from attempting to change rapists’ behavior in favor of changing women’s 
behavior—they simply note that speculating about patriarchal origins is not 
always constructive in shaping rape policy, as it does not appear to be 
independently criminogenic.90 
No less an authority than the Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network 
(RAINN) has warned of the consequences of allowing a monolithic critique 
of culture to distract from the uniquely condemnable individual culpability 
of the comparatively small percentage of men who are actually rapists: 
In the last few years, there has been an unfortunate trend towards blaming ‘rape culture’ 
for the extensive problem of sexual violence on campuses.  While it is helpful to point 
 
84  See supra Part I and supporting footnotes. 
85  Aya Gruber, Anti-Rape Culture, 64 KAN. L. REV. 1027, 1048–49 (2016). 
86  Id. at 1048. 
87  Id. at 1049.  
88  Id. at 1049–50. 
89  David P. Bryden & Erica Madore, Patriarchy, Sexual Freedom, and Gender Equality 
as Causes of Rape, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 299, 345 (2016). 
90  Id. 
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out the systemic barriers to addressing the problem, it is important to not lose sight of 
a simple fact: rape is caused not by cultural factors but by the conscious decisions, of a 
small percentage of the community, to commit a violent crime.91 
Even in pursuit of the very laudable goal of getting the justice system to 
accurately label and punish acquaintance rapists such as Brock Turner and 
the Steubenville defendants, it does a disservice to their victims to blur their 
criminal conduct into that of every boorish or mildly inappropriate display of 
masculinity (such as, for example, the campaign video of Ted Cruz trying to 
kiss his very reluctant daughter, which Huffington Post blogger Charles 
Clymer described as a “prime example” of “‘benign’ rape culture.”92) 
Another potentially problematic feature of the “rape culture” critique is 
the extent to which it has focused heavily on college campuses.  The 
horrifying statistic that one in five female college students has been sexually 
assaulted has been widely-circulated in the press, even by President Obama, 
who made campus rape a “marquee issue” for his administration.93  That 
statistic comes from the 2007 Campus Sexual Assault Study, funded by the 
National Institute of Justice, which had a sample size of 5,466 female college 
students at two public universities.94  Yet those numbers diverge wildly from 
other studies, such as the National Crime Victimization Survey, conducted in 
2011 by the federal government with a national sample of females age 
eighteen to twenty-four.95  In that study, an estimated 0.8% of non-college 
respondents reported that they were victims of threatened, attempted, or 
completed sexual assault, in contrast to approximately 0.6% of college 
females.96  It is difficult to evaluate these numbers, particularly in light of the 
data, discussed in Section I.A suggesting that college students are less likely 
to report sexual assault than are their non-college counterparts. 
Regardless, Deborah Tuerkheimer argues that the potentially misguided 
focus on primarily campus rape has created a “discrepancy between 
competing rape definitions,” one of which involves non-forcible sexual 
 
91  Letter from Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network (RAINN) to White House Task 
Force to Protect Students from Sexual Assault (Feb. 28, 2014), https://www.rainn.org/ 
images/03-2014/WH-Task-Force-RAINN-Recommendations.pdf. 
92  Blake Neff, HuffPo Contributor: Cruz’s Awkward Daughter Hug Example of ‘Rape 
Culture,’ DAILY CALLER (Feb. 1, 2016), http://dailycaller.com/2016/02/01/huffpo-
contributor-cruzs-awkward-daughter-hug-example-of-rape-culture/. 
93  Emily Yoffe, The College Rape Overcorrection, SLATE (Dec. 7, 2014), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2014/12/college_rape_campus_sexual_assa
ult_is_a_serious_problem_but_the_efforts.html. 
94  CHRISTOPHER KREBS ET AL., THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT STUDY vii (Oct. 2007), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/221153.pdf. 
95  See generally SINOZICH & LANGTON, supra note 18.  
96  Id. at 1. 
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violations by acquaintances in a college setting, and the other of which 
perpetuates the myth of the force requirement in most other settings.97  She 
argues that this false dichotomy overlooks non-forcible violations against 
non-student victims, who are, contrary to current popular assumptions, 
actually even more vulnerable to acquaintance or intimate partner rape than 
are undergraduates.98 
And, of course, there is the risk of actual false reporting.  While this is 
a risk in all criminal contexts, the old myth that it was much more likely in 
sexual assault cases has resulted in an overcorrection whereby commentators 
sometimes suggest that even raising the concern is, in and of itself, a part of 
rape culture.99  Because the university setting is unique in that it has its own, 
sub-legal disciplinary system, students accused of rape can be expelled from 
school (and stigmatized forever) with procedural safeguards far below the 
standard required by the Due Process Clause in a criminal context.100  This 
trend has been motivated in part by pressure from the Department of 
Education’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR), which can strip schools of federal 
funding for failure to comply with Title IX of the Education Amendments of 
1972.101  In an open letter in the Boston Globe, twenty-eight Harvard Law 
School professors, citing the lack of rights to confrontation and counsel in 
Harvard’s new policies, protested that the OCR’s directives “lack the most 
basic elements of fairness and due process, are overwhelmingly stacked 
against the accused, and are in no way required by Title IX law or 
regulation.”102 
The question of whether or not OCR’s policies for adjudicating campus 
rape cases are sound or even constitutional is far beyond the scope of this 
article.  That said, the significant public turmoil generated by the debate is, 
in and of itself, a problem.  The cyclical relationship between law, culture, 
and under-reporting is likely only going to be exacerbated by a polarized 
public discourse in which the only two perceived options are dismissing the 
 
97  Deborah Tuerkheimer, Rape On and Off Campus, 65 EMORY L.J. 1, 5 (2015). 
98  Id.  
99  See, e.g., Jenny Kutner, False Reports of Rape are Vanishingly Rare, So Why Treat 
Women Like Liars By Default?, SALON (June 1, 2015), http://www.salon.com/ 
2015/06/01/false_reports_of_rape_are_vanishingly_rare_so_why_treat_women_as_liars_by
_default/. 
100  See Yoffe, supra note 93. 
101  Title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–88 (2017). 
102  Eugene Volokh, 28 Harvard Law Professors Condemn Harvard’s New Sexual 
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widespread victimization of women and fully excusing the culture that 
supports it or embarking on a non-differentiated war against “rape culture” 
that relies on new stereotypes about all of its participants.  Not only do such 
choices lead to a break-down in positive communication and education, they 
contribute further to the substantive confusion over the precise meaning of 
sexual assault. 
D. EXPRESSIVE PUNISHMENT: LEGAL NORMS SHAPING SOCIAL 
NORMS 
If cultural norms affect the law, the law likewise affects cultural norms.  
The “expressive” function of punishment is the law’s capacity to send a 
message of condemnation about a particular criminal act.103  In Jeffrie 
Murphy’s formulation, a wrongdoer’s crime sends a message to the world 
about the value of his victim: “[t]here are ways a wrongdoer has of saying to 
us, ‘I count but you do not,’ ‘I can use you for my purposes,’ or ‘I am here 
up high and you are there down below.’”104  Conversely, punishment sends a 
reciprocal message, in a kind of dialogue with the crime.105  Punishment 
allows the criminal justice system to condemn the criminal’s devaluation of 
the victim by devaluing him or her as a result of it. 
Anthony Duff explains that this communicative process is both forward 
and backward-looking, and that there are multiple audiences for the message 
communicated by punishment.106  In his framework, the expressive theory: 
Takes the primary communicative purpose of punishment to be the communication to 
offenders of the condemnation they deserve for the wrongs they have committed, and 
explains that purpose in back-ward looking terms of what we, as a polity, owe to 
victims, to offenders, and to ourselves as a political community . . . as a response to 
such wrongs . . . .107 
Yet punishment is also forward-looking because it helps the convicted 
to “understand, and so to repent [the] wrong as a wrong both against the 
individual victim (where there was one) and against the wider political 
community to which they both belong.”108  Expressive punishment therefore 
 
103  See generally Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING & 
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recognizes the relationships between victim, offender, and society as a whole 
that are all implicated by the offense.109  Punishment sends messages to the 
offender about his conduct, to the victim about his or her worth in the view 
of society at large, and to society about what we, collectively, demand from 
one another and refuse to tolerate.110 
Furthermore, the expressive function of punishment is both retributive 
and utilitarian.  As to the former, Jean Hampton argues that what the criminal 
justice system must express through punishment is the message of 
equivalence between victim and offender that lies at the heart of retributivism 
or “just desserts” theory: 
The retributive punisher uses the infliction of suffering to symbolize the subjugation of 
the subjugator, the domination of the one who dominated the victim.  And the message 
carried in this subjugation is ‘What you did to her, she can do to you.  So you’re equal.’  
The one who acted as if he were the lord of the victim is humbled to show that he isn’t 
lord after all.  In this way, the demeaning message implicit in his action is denied.  
Therefore, just as the crime has symbolic meaning, so too does the punishment.111 
While retributivism does not fundamentally require an expressive 
component—an offender can be punished according to just desserts for the 
sake of the punishment itself—as I have argued previously, Hampton’s 
theory gets to the heart of the symbolic effects of a crime.112  “Implicit in 
expressive retributivism is the concept that, even if a punishment can be 
proportional to the physical harm done to a victim, the symbolic harm can 
only be remedied if this proportionality is communicated to all parties 
involved, including the public.”113 
More importantly for our current purposes, expressive punishment 
likewise serves a utilitarian function.  The law has the power to change social 
norms and behavior via the messages it expresses, through what has been 
called a “persuasive” and “acculturating” effect.114  Thus, even if we set aside 
concerns about proportionality of punishment as an end in and of itself, 
simply communicating condemnation of certain behavior—particularly if it 
does so in a way that is seen as procedurally fair—may lead to a practical 
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111  Hampton, supra note 103, at 5. 
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reduction in crime.115  Furthermore, punishing an offender appears to have 
the additional utilitarian benefit of increasing a victim’s social standing in his 
or her community.116 
The communicative function of punishment flows not only from the 
actual sentence imposed in a particular case, but also from the full gamut of 
institutional expressions at each stage of the criminal process.  The existence 
and content of a criminal law in the first place expresses that conduct beyond 
certain parameters is unacceptable and warrants official sanction; this 
message-sending function is frequently noted in the legislative debates over 
proposed statutes.117  As Avlana Eisenberg notes in her study on the 
expressive effects of hate crime prosecutions, enforcement decisions can also 
be expressive.118  With only so much bandwidth, prosecutors necessarily 
wield a broad degree of discretion in deciding what cases to bring.119  As 
Eisenberg puts it, “much of a law’s communicative impact is not felt until 
later and is bound up with whether and how the legislation is enforced.”120 
With these goals in mind, it is clear to see how the underreporting and 
under-enforcement of sexual assault laws—certainly when attributable to the 
endurance of rape myths within the system, but even when caused by 
inescapable evidentiary and resource issues—has led to an expressive crisis 
surrounding the criminalization of sexual assault.  The law’s failure to 
penalize many forms of sexist violence has created a kind of cultural 
permission for these acts.121  As a result, the systemic difficulties we have 
encountered in defining a sexual assault and the requirements for proving 
lack of consent have resulted in a significant public discourse among sexual 
assault survivors who feel as though the system cannot or will not recognize 
the wrongs they have suffered. 
The Twitter hashtag #WhyWomenDontReport has collected thousands 
of tweets by women identifying as sexual assault survivors providing 
explanations for why they did not seek recourse through the criminal justice 
system.122  While the spectrum of reasons given by these women runs the 
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gamut from fear of professional fallout to cultural resistance to generalized 
fear of not being believed by communities, friends, and family, many women 
point to the criminal justice system itself as being unwelcoming or unwilling 
to provide redress or even threatening to the victims in and of itself.123 
A survey of tweets falling into the latter category provides a number of 
examples: 
“Because no matter when you tell your story, they’ll try to discredit you with “Why 
now?”124 
“From the moment a woman walks into a police station/hospital the system is working 
against her.”125 
“I watched enough SVU to know no one would believe me.  I was 15 & scared.  I knew 
the cops were ppl who would hurt Muslims like me.”126 
A quick scan of the contributions to the hashtag in December 2016 
provides some others: 
“Also why on earth would women ever report at this point?  Because the justice system 
has been so kind to survivors?”127 
“Because they’ll [sic] be mountains of evidence of rape and this chump will put it down 
to ‘young girls lying for attention.’”128 
“Despite marital rape being illegal, no one believes it’s possible since your relationship 
must be a sign of consent.”129 
“So our new AG appears to not know what constitutes sexual assault.”130 
The expressive breakdown around the criminalization of sexual assault 
roared into the public sphere in the Brock Turner case, after he was convicted 
of manually sexually assaulting an unconscious woman and subsequently 
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sentenced to only six months in county jail.131  California Superior Court 
Judge Aaron Persky prompted outrage with his observation, during 
sentencing, that “a prison sentence would have a severe impact on him. I 
think he will not be a danger to others.”132  The impact statement given by 
the Stanford victim created a social media firestorm after it was released by 
the court and appeared on the website BuzzFeed.133  The statement had 
immediate public resonance in part due to the victim’s eloquent account of 
the harm she had suffered after the non-consensual encounter, as well as her 
re-victimization by the justice system itself.134 
E. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
It is impossible to make confident assertions of causation in a context as 
complex as the tangle of social and legal circumstances affecting sexual 
assault enforcement.  That said, the preceding analysis reveals a significant, 
mutually reinforcing relationship between appearance and reality 
complicating the legal system’s ability to address rape.  Longstanding 
assumptions about the nature of rape have thwarted enforcement of new legal 
definitions, perhaps due in part to prosecutorial knowledge of likely juror 
behavior (in addition, of course, to legitimate evidentiary problems).  In turn, 
under-enforcement appears to have contributed to both underreporting, and a 
widely shared belief among victims and some women that the criminal 
system does not provide justice.  To the extent that the system expresses this 
message through under-enforcement, it contributes to the original cultural 
assumptions that only certain forms of non-consensual sex qualify as “real 
rape.”  Which brings us back to the beginning, in a perfectly vicious cycle.  
Courts, prosecutors, and lawmakers must find a way to interrupt this cycle 
by changing the expressive messages about rape the criminal justice system 
currently produces. 
II. BROKEN WINDOWS THEORY 
This Part will explore what we know about using the criminal law to 
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manage appearances in the hopes of changing reality.  I take up the most 
famous example of this effort, the Broken Windows theory of policing, to 
consider its strengths, weaknesses, and potential application to the 
prosecution of sexual assault. 
A. THE THEORY AND ITS CRITICS 
In a famous 1982 article for the Atlantic Monthly, criminologists James 
Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling proposed that policing minor offenses, such 
as loitering, panhandling, prostitution, and graffiti, might reduce more 
serious crime.135  Their idea turned on the relationship between the 
appearance of disorder and the actual amount of disorderly behavior in 
society: “If a window in a building is broken and left unrepaired, all of the 
windows will soon be broken.”136  As its name suggests, “Broken Windows” 
theory has a strong aesthetic component, and has been associated with the 
elimination of offenses—such as the particular form of pan-handling engaged 
in by New York City’s “squeegee men”—most likely to be visually irritating 
to a city-dweller going about his or her daily life.137 
This theory eventually became the basis for new policing strategies in 
several major U.S. cities in the 1990s, most notably Rudolph Giuliani’s New 
York.138  The New York Police Department (NYPD) increased arrests for 
minor yet visible misdemeanor and ordinance violations; the years 1994 and 
1998 saw an increase in misdemeanor arrests by about 40,000 per year.139  
Other cities, such as Chicago and Los Angeles, followed suit and adopted a 
Broken Windows approach to policing, otherwise known as “order 
maintenance” policing.140  The years 1991 to 2001 also saw a dramatic, 
nation-wide drop in crime—homicide by 43%, violent crime by 34%, and 
property crime by 29% according to some measures.141  While more 
measurable factors such as the overall increase in the number of police, the 
rise of the prison population, the decline of the crack epidemic, and the 
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legalization of abortion can help explain this drop,142 supporters of order 
maintenance theory declared victory.143 
The exact mechanism by which Broken Windows theory operates has 
always been somewhat hazy.  As Adam Samaha notes, the theory is not a 
monolithic idea of causation but, rather, a collection of various potential 
relationships between appearance and disorder.144  He notes, for example, 
that “one might hypothesize that the appearance of a broken window will 
soon lead to an outbreak of window breaking and nothing else, or that much 
more serious misconduct will soon follow,” but that, regardless, “a theme in 
broken windows theory of misconduct is that the appearance of disorder 
suggests to observers that disorder is uncontrolled and that this perception 
prompts some people toward even greater disorder that is, in fact, not 
controlled.”145 
Despite the staggering drop in crime—which was even greater in New 
York City, where Broken Windows policing was most widely adopted—
criminologists hotly contest its efficacy.  No scholarly consensus currently 
exists on the theory, and there is, at best, weak empirical evidence to support 
its broadest form.146  In a 2015 meta-analysis of thirty randomized tests of 
disorder policing, Anthony Braga and his co-authors discovered a statistically 
significant, modest crime reduction effect, across a range of violent, property, 
and drug-based offenses.147  Specifically, they found that the strongest effects 
are generated by community and problem-solving interventions designed to 
change social and physical disorder conditions at particular places.148  
Conversely, aggressive order maintenance strategies that target individual 
disorderly behaviors do not generate significant crime reductions.149  The 
various studies undergirding these conclusions merit summary. 
In a 1990 study of thirty neighborhoods, Wesley Skogan found a 
statistically significant relationship between citizens’ perceptions of disorder 
and the rate of robbery, even after controlling for race, poverty, and proxies 
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for neighborhood stability.150  However, Bernard Harcourt, examining the 
same data, concluded that Skogan’s study should be qualified due to the facts 
that it omitted certain data on robbery and disorder, and that the victims 
surveyed had not been asked about the location of the relevant crimes.151  
Further, he concluded there was no statistically significant relationship 
between perceptions of disorder and other crimes beyond robbery, such as 
rape, burglary, assault, or purse snatching.152 
In a 2001 Manhattan Institute study of New York City neighborhoods 
in the 1990s, George Kelling and William Sousa found a large, statistically 
significant inverse relationship between misdemeanor arrests and violent 
crime (defined as homicide, rape, robbery, and felony assault).153  By 
contrast, they could not find a significant positive relationship between the 
violent crime rate and other proxy variables, such as cocaine use, young male 
population, and low socioeconomic conditions.154  Kelling and Sousa 
concluded that a neighborhood could expect to suffer one less violent crime 
for approximately every twenty-eight misdemeanor arrests and that Broken 
Windows policing had thus prevented over 60,000 violent crimes in the 
1990s.155 
By contrast, Bernard Harcourt and Jens Ludwig used data similar to 
Kelling and Sousa, but controlled for the violent crime rate in each 
neighborhood leading up to 1989 and shifted from the average arrest rate for 
the decade to the yearly arrest rate from the years 1989 to 1998.156  Harcourt 
and Ludwig concluded that the pattern of crime reduction Kelling and Sousa 
attributed to “Broken Windows” policing was equally consistent with “mean 
reversion”—that those precincts receiving the most Broken Windows 
policing were the ones that experienced the largest increases and levels of 
crime during New York’s crack epidemic.157  In other words, precincts that 
had the most severe increases in crime also had the sharpest decreases, as 
they readjusted to the state of affairs prior to the epidemic.158  The authors 
further found, based on data from a five-city social experiment called 
“Moving to Opportunity,” that participants’ movements to less disorderly, 
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less disadvantaged communities did not appear to reduce criminal behavior, 
and that therefore if disorder does affect crime, such effects are: “Small 
enough to be dominated by whatever pernicious effects on people’s criminal 
behavior may arise from increases in neighborhood socioeconomic status, as 
would be expected to occur to some degree in normal circumstances as 
neighborhoods with declines in disorder begin to gentrify.”159 
Despite the fact that the sweeping claims about the success of Broken 
Windows—particularly in the political rhetoric of the Giuliani 
administration160—do not appear to be borne out by the data, other research 
does reveal an impact around the margins, particularly in certain contexts.  
Richard Rosenfeld et al., controlling for mean reversion, examined precinct-
level data on robbery and homicide rates in the years 1984 and 1988.161  They 
found that these offenses were statistically significantly associated with 
misdemeanor and ordinance-violation arrests from 1988 to 2001, though they 
also concluded that these arrests explained only 7–12% of the decline in 
homicides and 1–5% of the decline in robberies.162  Other work suggests that 
Broken Windows policing has an impact only on certain crimes, such as 
homicide with guns, and little effect on others, such as homicide without guns 
(presumably because misdemeanor arrests allow the police the opportunity 
to get guns off of the street incident to arrest, which does not itself relate to 
the hypothesis that perceptions of disorder affect violent crime).163  While 
these impacts are small, as Samaha points out, “it depends on what counts as 
small when lives are at stake and when people have only so many policy 
levers to pull.”164 
A couple of other studies have found some smaller, context-specific 
Broken Windows impacts.  In 2010, Magdalena Certa and her colleagues 
broke down New York City gun homicides into three groups by victim age, 
and concluded that higher misdemeanor arrest rates did have a statistically 
significant negative association with the rate of gun homicide on adult 
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victims thirty-five-years and older between 1990 and 1999.165  Broken 
Windows theory looks more promising when examined not as a blunt tool 
positing overall violent crime reduction from a zero-tolerance misdemeanor 
arrest policy, but with attention to specific policing strategies.  In 2008, 
Anthony Braga and Brenda Bond studied thirty-four high-crime areas in 
Lowell, Massachusetts, and divided them into pairs, where one of each pair 
received a number of law-enforcement interventions.166  Such interventions 
included: “order maintenance” strategies, such as increases in misdemeanor 
arrests and stops-and-frisks; “situational strategies” to target disorder, such 
as more street lighting, video surveillance, and destruction of vacant 
buildings; and “social service” strategies that connected law enforcement 
with mental health providers, homeless shelters, and youth recreation 
services.167  After one year, the experimental neighborhoods had around 20% 
fewer emergency calls than the control neighborhoods.168  Among the three 
methods of intervention, situational strategies were most strongly associated 
with fewer calls; misdemeanor arrests were less effective but still statistically 
significant, and social service strategies failed to produce a significant 
effect.169 
In their meta-analysis of all of this literature, Braga and Bond concluded 
that order maintenance policing is an effective use of law enforcement 
resources, but that it is most effective when it involves a cooperative effort 
between law enforcement and other stakeholders: “[I]ncivility reduction is 
rooted in a tradition of stable relationships with the community and 
responsiveness to local concerns . . . a sole commitment to increasing 
misdemeanor arrests . . . may undermine relationships in low-income, urban 
minority communities where coproduction is most needed and distrust 
between the police and citizens is most profound.”170 
The work of Braga and Bond constitutes the first large-scale meta-
analysis of the data on Broken Windows policing, and suggests that there is 
indeed at least some value to focusing on reducing low-level disorder, and 
the appearance thereof, as a means of targeting higher level violent crime.171  
Yet, their attention to the potential risk of undermining the relationship 
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between law enforcement and citizens in low income and minority 
communities highlights another common criticism of Broken Windows. 
Scholars criticize Broken Windows for its alienation of minority 
communities from the police that should be protecting them: “NYPD arrest 
policies . . . have helped shape a managerial, non-adjudicative, order-
maintenance system of criminal justice that reflects the growing racial and 
socioeconomic divide between New York City’s haves and have-nots.”172  
While Broken Windows as a theory is race-neutral, there is significant 
evidence that it has been deployed by law enforcement in a racialized manner, 
resulting in exactly the mutual hostility between law enforcement and 
citizens warned of by the Braga study.173  The widespread use of “stop-and-
frisk” given Fourth Amendment sanction by the Supreme Court in Terry v. 
Ohio has become emblematic of this ongoing problem, particularly on the 
occasions it spirals into police violence against unarmed citizens.174  Thus, 
any argument based in part upon the idea of order maintenance must take into 
account the terrible costs of its racialized misapplication. 
B. THE VARIOUS FUNCTIONS OF REGULATING FOR APPEARANCE 
I mentioned previously that the Broken Windows theory may suggest 
more than one understanding of the relationship between perceived disorder 
and criminal harm, depending on the nature of the particular harm sought to 
be prevented.175  To consider the theory’s potential application to the specific 
context of sexual assault, we must be precise about the relationship with 
which we presume to work.  Adam Samaha has proposed a framework for 
understanding the major categories of potential connection between 
appearance and reality in the context of government policy-making, which 
provides a useful analytical aid for this process.176 
Samaha identifies three relevant relationships: 1) reality insulated from 
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appearance, 2) appearance driving reality, and 3) reality collapsing into 
appearance from the outset.177  As an example of reality insulated from 
appearance, he points to a bridge, the actual safety of which may diverge, 
even radically, from its appearance.178  While it would be undesirable to have 
a structurally safe bridge that looked run-down, thus deterring people from 
using it, it would be even worse if it looked safe and was not deterring people 
from using it.  In contrast, to illustrate the case of appearance driving reality 
Samaha gives the example of a bank.179  Samaha notes that banks go out of 
their way to project an appearance of respectability and solidity through such 
means as steel and granite architectural choices.180  The trick “is to generate 
the belief among a sufficient number of potential and actual depositors that 
the banks will not be destabilized by depositors making a run.”181  In that 
manner, appearance becomes reality because confident depositors leave their 
money in the institution: “Widespread depositor confidence in a bank can 
make the institution justifiably stable, whether or not the expectation against 
a future bank run can be counted as a false belief.”182 
In applying these first two categories to the current state of knowledge 
on Broken Windows theory, Samaha cautions that its proponents may put too 
much weight on the assumption that it functions according to a bank model, 
where enforcing the appearance of order secures actual order.  If this is not 
true—if crime control functions, instead, according to a bridge model— then 
Broken Windows policing may pose “transparency problems.”183  
Transparency problems arise in bridge models where the general public is 
misled about the reality of a policy situation by focusing instead on 
appearances.184  In the case of Broken Windows this would mean that the 
public was overly persuaded that the new policing strategy drove down 
violent crime.185 
Samaha notes that the gap between appearance and reality in this context 
may be narrower and therefore less harmful than in other contexts, such as 
political corruption: “The broken windows transparency issue involves over-
claiming about the causal effect of a policing strategy, rather than misleading 
the public about violent crime or misdemeanor arrest rates.”186  By contrast, 
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he points out, judicial enforcement of campaign finance regulation has 
become so focused on the “appearance of corruption” that courts have 
stopped asking whether fixing appearances will do anything to prevent actual 
corruption.187  In any case, the current data suggests that Broken Windows 
policing may engage both the bridge and bank model: the efficacy of focusing 
on appearance to fix reality has likely been overstated by political actors in 
this context, but there remains evidence that, at least in certain circumstances, 
a bank model applies.188 
That said, Samaha’s third category—cases where reality collapses into 
appearance from the outset—provides another useful framework for 
understanding Broken Windows.189  To illustrate this model, he uses the 
example of the clock constructed in a town square to serve as the official time 
for a municipality.190  As he puts it, “[i]n the case of standard time used for 
coordination purposes, the reality in question is constructed from beliefs that 
follow salient representations of time.”191  In other words, there is no “deeper 
truth” to the fact that it is 12:00 PM—it just matters that everyone agrees 
12:00 PM is the same thing.192  The clock is an aesthetic mechanism for 
coordinating the minds of all of the citizens to create the relevant reality: that 
it’s 12:00 PM whenever the clock says it is.193 
Samaha contends that arguments surrounding policy decisions in which 
appearance and reality collapse rely on “logic and values special to aesthetics 
and expressivism.”194  This is because even where appearance and reality 
collapse, there is debate as to the content of what should result; the examples 
he gives on that point are the fact that constitutional challenges to 
government-sponsored Confederate flags are rarely judicially entertained 
despite the fact that challenges to government-sponsored religious symbols 
are.195  These debates center on taste-like evaluations, similar to arguments 
over textual interpretation.196  While Samaha characterizes these sorts of 
decisions as largely aesthetic,197 he may overly minimize them.  Defining a 
criminal offense is, on the one hand, a purely expressive problem: we must 
agree collectively on what legally constitutes rape, in much the same way 
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that we agree upon what constitutes 12:00 PM.  Both are somewhat artificial 
constructions, but the former clearly has both moral and utilitarian 
significance. 
As to the justifications for Broken Windows theory, Samaha proposes 
that the bridge/bank problem he identified could be mitigated if policy-
makers focused more on the “clock” model.198  The transparency problems 
would disappear if there were no gap between appearance and reality: in other 
words, if the orderly appearance attained through misdemeanor enforcement 
were the end in and of itself.199  As he puts it: “Most people seem to find 
graffiti ugly, loitering discomforting, and public urination obnoxious.  If it 
effectively targets these problems, [B]roken [W]indows policing could be 
worth the cost without any benefit other than aesthetic comfort for 
mainstream residents.”200 
This argument is, of course, open to the criticism that, if all we’re really 
getting from Broken Windows is better aesthetics, it is not worth the well-
documented costs in terms of racialized enforcement—at least unless 
enforcement practices change dramatically.  Nonetheless, Samaha’s 
categories give us a much broader canvas to paint on as we consider the 
function of broken windows theory in any particular context. 
C. CONSIDERATIONS FOR A BROKEN WINDOWS APPROACH TO 
SEXUAL ASSAULT 
The prior sections have explained how the under-enforcement of sexual 
assault laws create expressive problems that tend to devalue the experiences 
of rape victims; the centrality of defining consent to these problems; and the 
mechanisms by which Broken Windows policing may affect the relationship 
between appearance and reality.201  I now suggest a framework for thinking 
about sexual assault enforcement and Broken Windows.  Existing research 
suggests that Broken Windows policing may productively manage the 
relationship between appearance and reality in the area of crime control in 
one of two ways: 1) through a bank model, which is controversial but is 
supported by at least some evidence, or 2) through a clock model, insofar as 
it attacks detrimental appearances for their own sake.202  Further, with regard 
to the clock model, we can also say that appearances can be changed for their 
own sake to create new expressive legal values, which may themselves be 
contested (the Confederate flag and the religious icons, for example—or the 
 
198  Id. at 1632. 
199  Id.  
200  Id. 
201  See supra Parts I–II.B and supporting footnotes. 
202  See Samaha, supra note 144. 
SHELEY 6/5/18  1:52 PM 
488 SHELEY [Vol. 108 
meaning of a legal term such as sexual assault).203 
With respect to sexual assault, the question we should ask of a bank 
model is whether we can use the law to alter the appearances of the world as 
a sexually dangerous place for women—widely described as rape culture—
in such a way that it would have a positive effect on reality.  We should ask 
of a clock model whether there are contestable appearances of sexual danger 
that create their own reality.  In other words, are there choices in policy or 
enforcement we could make that would directly alter the aesthetic fact of rape 
culture itself, with positive results, even if they did not lead to a reduction in 
the reality of actual sexual assault?  I will refer to this as the narrow clock 
model.  But I propose that we can ask a third question here as well.  Are there 
openly debated expressive values—particularly related to the currently 
volatile legal understanding of consent—that we can alter through attention 
to appearances?  I will refer to this as the broad clock model. 
The data on Broken Windows theory generally does not give us concrete 
answers to the bridge model question, though Braga and Bond’s 2015 study 
suggests that the best place to start would be through a model of community 
engagement, focused on specific geographic places.204  Thus, we would want 
to think more about the role of space and community as a context for sexual 
assault.  As to both the narrow and broad forms of the clock model, we should 
look to the sexualized aspects of disorder qua disorder.  Wesley Skogan, who 
has studied disorder itself as part of the “downward spiral of urban decay” 
describes its social dimensions with attention to this component: 
Disorder is evident in the widespread appearance of junk and trash in vacant lots; it is 
evident, too, in decaying homes, boarded-up buildings, the vandalism of public and 
private property, graffiti, and stripped and abandoned cars in streets and alleys.  It is 
signaled by bands of teenagers congregating on street corners, by the presence of 
prostitutes and panhandlers, by public drinking, the verbal harassment of women, and 
open gambling and drug use.205 
Skogan’s account recognizes sexual violence—in the form of gender-
based street harassment— as a component of general disorder, the component 
that drives the appearance of sexual danger for women.  This recognition 
suggests that we should look to street harassment if we are going to apply 
Broken Windows theory to the appearance of sexual violence.206  Yet 
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Skogan’s account likewise groups street harassment with a list of aesthetic, 
property, and vice crimes and ailments, most of which lack specific human 
victims.  This failure in and of itself belies the fact that harassment has been 
insufficiently recognized as an offense of violence against the person, rather 
than merely an unattractive symptom of urban disorder.  To better understand 
how Broken Windows can help us with the precise expressive harms of 
sexual “disorder,” we need to consider street harassment as a unique problem. 
III. STREET HARASSMENT 
As mentioned, Broken Windows enforcement has focused heavily on 
the visual.  The theory relies upon the public perceiving a world that was 
cleaner, safer, and more orderly.  While street harassment differs from 
vandalism in that it has an immediate, human victim, it is highly visible.  It 
thus differs dramatically from sexual assault, which most often takes place 
behind closed doors with few witnesses other than the assailant and the 
victim.  Yet street harassment carries with it the threat of sexual violence of 
which rape is the ultimate manifestation.  In that way, the two offenses are 
linked far more closely than vandalism or pan-handling and assault or 
murder.  For that reason we can profitably explore how regulating the 
appearance of sexual assault may impact its reality. 
A. WHAT IS STREET HARASSMENT? 
Street harassment has been notoriously hard to define, and it 
encompasses a wide range of behavior.  According to one account, we can 
observe a three-level hierarchy of street harassment, with the most severe 
incarnations including 1) “sexually explicit references to a woman’s body or 
[] sexual [acts]”; 2) gender-based profanity; 3) qualifying comments 
accompanied by slurs about race or sexual orientation; and 4 ) physical acts 
such as groping.207 Moderately severe harassment includes sexual innuendos 
or “references to a woman’s gender or body that are not sexually explicit.”208  
The least severe category includes staring, whistling, or comments made to a 
woman that are “unnecessary or not political in nature.”209 
Street harassment is very pervasive. According to a 2014 study, 65% of 
women and 25% of men experienced street harassment over the course of 
their lifetime.210  For 41% of women and 16% of men, that harassment 
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became physically aggressive.211  In addition, minority respondents were 
disproportionately likely to experience such harassment.212 
In response to a non-scientific query posted to the author’s Facebook 
page, women revealed a consciousness of how their changing appearances 
and life choices affected the incidence of harassment.  One woman reported 
that she used to be catcalled about twenty to thirty times a year before she 
started dying her hair vivid, unusual colors.  She speculated that there might 
be 
a silencing of certain types of men, to whom I used to read as a meek and well-mannered 
middle-class white lady, and therefore a low-risk target.  I now seem slightly more 
likely to freak the fuck out on them/be a crazy bitch of one sort or another, so they opt 
not to catcall.213 
Another woman, who estimated she was harassed about seventy-five to 
eighty times in 2016, reports: 
At least two times they involved actual touching of my body, usually in the form of 
touching my arm.  In one instance a man on a train tried to move my hand toward his 
crotch, while saying ‘you are pretty’ and ‘I know what you are,’ [referring, ostensibly, 
to her identity as a trans woman] as the other hand remained in his pocket fingering 
either his penis or a weapon.214 
A third observed that moving from a “walking” city to a “driving” city 
had resulted in a noticeable release from old anxieties about harassment: 
I love being wrapped in the protective encasement of my car, safe(r) 
from street harassment than I was in the public transport oriented cities I’ve lived in 
previously.  Sure, I love the idea of walking more, but in practice that means more 
exposure to harassment and more active fear of things much worse than 
‘mere’ harassment.  Now I get in the car, I lock the doors, I breathe easier.215  
A fourth said that “harassment dropped dramatically for me after I 
chopped off my hair—people don’t seem to see short hair and think ‘woman,’ 
even when I’m wearing distinctly ‘female’ clothes (I don’t see that as a 
drawback).”216  And a fifth said “[A]s a fat woman, the harassment I have 
experienced . . . hasn’t been catcalling but more of the sort like “watch out, 
fatty” (even if I wasn’t near bumping into them or they were invading MY 
space) version.  I’m only now beginning to realize that is harassment just like 
catcalling.”217 
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These accounts vividly demonstrate how street harassment shapes, 
overtly and implicitly, a woman’s awareness of her own physical 
embodiment.  While none of the respondents changed their appearances or 
residence to avoid street harassment, their accounts share a latent awareness 
of how anonymous harassers’ definition of what constitutes desirable—and 
thus available—femininity can impact a woman’s interaction with the world 
on a day-to-day basis. 
B. DEFINING THE HARM 
Over the last twenty or so years, feminist scholars have worked to define 
the precise nature of the harm imposed by street harassment as part of the 
argument that it ought to be legally cognizable.  A common theme in this 
literature is the extent to which street harassment entrenches a lowered 
standard of basic privacy for women in public spaces, in violation of 
otherwise established cultural norms about “civil inattention” (essentially, 
the idea that staring at strangers is rude).218  As Cynthia Grant Bowman 
observes, “[u]nlike men, women passing through public areas are subject to 
‘markers of passage’ that imply either that women are acting out of role 
simply by their presence in public or that a part of their role is in fact to be 
open to the public.”219  Bowman argues that because breaches of the norm of 
civil inattention tend to occur when there is something unusual or out-of-
place about the person observed, the practice of singling out women in public 
spaces for commentary shows that “women, unlike men, belong in the private 
sphere, the sphere of domestic rather than public responsibility.”220  She notes 
that, ironically, “men convey this message by intruding upon a woman’s 
privacy as she enters the public sphere.” 221 
Conceived of in these terms, street harassment imposes a significant 
harm separate from whatever specific embarrassment or discomfort a woman 
might experience on a given occasion.  To the extent it is tolerated, such 
behavior contributes to a shared cultural norm against women accessing 
public spaces—a norm with obvious disadvantages for the professional, 
recreational, and commercial lives of half the population.  Every time a 
woman decides against a career with a substantial public, outdoor component 
(landscaping, for example), or decides not to walk to the store to spend money 
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at a certain time of night, this norm affects more than simply the woman’s 
dignity on the particular occasion. 
The literature also identifies the psychological harms arising from street 
harassment.  First, it contributes to hostility between the sexes, making it 
more difficult for even well-intentioned men to communicate with women 
innocuously.222  Second, and perhaps most obviously, it has an enormously 
disruptive effect on women’s identities and self-image: as Bowman puts it, 
“[w]omen learn to associate their bodies with fear, shame[,] and humiliation.  
Women also learn their place in society from language, and they learn that 
this place is not a public one.”223  Beth Livingston identifies emotions ranging 
from fear, anxiety, anger, shame, and helplessness among the victims of 
street harassment and notes that “[t]hese sorts of emotions—particularly 
when experienced day after day—can become paralyzing . . . .  It is incredibly 
likely that, as with many other negative emotional experiences, the impact 
can accumulate over time, leading to behavioral and health outcomes that we 
should be concerned about.”224  Harassment has also been associated with the 
phenomenon of “self-objectification,” a psychological process by which a 
subject begins to think of her body as an object for the pleasure of others.225  
Self-objectification “can [] teach individuals to ‘associate their bodies with 
fear and humiliation . . . [which] may also interfere with [their] ability to be 
comfortable with [their] sexuality.’”226  Beyond that, it is correlated with 
other negative emotional states such as depression, anxiety, and eating 
disorders.227 
Feminist scholars have used the term “spirit murder,” originally devised 
by Patricia Williams in the context of race, to describe the deep harm street 
harassers inflict on their victims.228  The idea is that private behavior that 
overtly imposes racist or sexist thought on a victim creates and perpetuates 
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subordinating social structures, and gives hatred and fear an outlet.229  
Deirdre Davis proposes that this complex tangle of adverse social and 
psychological effects flowing from street harassment can be classified into 
four categories: exclusion, domination, invasion, and oppression, which all 
contribute to “genderizing” the street.230  It excludes by “mark[ing] the street 
as male.”231  It dominates by “establishing the rules of women’s 
participation” in a street environment.232  It invades by removing women’s 
sense of privacy.233  And it oppresses by forcing women to alter their behavior 
to avoid it.234 
While the forgoing summarized the most direct harms street harassment 
imposes on a victim, scholars have theorized that it must also be understood 
within a broader context of gender subordination and potential sexual 
violence.  As Deborah Tuerkheimer puts it: 
Because we can never transcend social context, an interaction between one man and 
one woman on the street implicates gender and hierarchy in complicated ways that may 
go unrecognized by either party.  When women refer to the power that a harasser wields, 
we allude to the power that he has by virtue of his maleness.  On the street, a successful 
female executive can be made to feel powerless by a teenage boy who, by his words 
alone, “expresses male control over sexual access” to her.235 
Thus, street harassment is problematic both in and of itself and as a 
reminder of the pervasive threat of literal sexual violation women face.  
While street harassment is far more pervasive than the threat of physical 
sexual assault, the latter is common enough that women experience the 
connection between rape and street harassment on a subjective level.236  
Because of its oppressive and sexualized nature, street harassment “reminds 
women of their vulnerability to violent attack in American urban centers and 
to sexual violence in general.”237 
The most extreme view holds that street harassment forms a part of 
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“sexual terrorism”—“men’s systematic control and domination of women 
through actual and implied violence.”238  In a worst-case scenario, potential 
rapists can use street harassment to figure out how vulnerable a target may 
be to intimidation.239  But even the perception that this could be the case can 
cause a range of psychological and physiological responses in a victim.  This 
is particularly true for a victim who is already the survivor of sexual assault, 
for whom street harassment might be particularly frightening or traumatic.240  
One 2014 study found that nearly two-thirds of female respondents reported 
being at least somewhat concerned that the harassment would escalate into 
something far worse.241 
C. PROSECUTING HARASSMENT 
Perhaps due to the complex and heavily gender-specific nature of street 
harassment, the measures to combat it taken by various jurisdictions (and 
those proposed in the literature) take many forms.  Unfortunately, nearly all 
of these measures face either theoretical or pragmatic obstacles.  Before 
considering how the law might address the harms of street harassment, one 
must consider the operation of the First Amendment.242  Street harassment is 
an exercise of speech—an obnoxious, harmful exercise of speech, but 
perhaps no more so than much political speech that falls squarely within the 
heartland of the First Amendment’s protections against laws that would 
regulate speech based on content.243  Any attempt to regulate speech purely 
on the basis that it expresses a demeaning view of gender or sexualizes the 
female identity would run into problems on this ground. 
Nonetheless, the First Amendment provides no absolute protections.244  
A state may regulate speech based on the time, place, or manner in which it 
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takes place, where the mode of expression is “basically incompatible with the 
normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.”245  Such restrictions 
will pass constitutional muster so long as they are: 1) content-neutral; 2) 
narrowly tailored; 3) serve a significant state interest; and 4) leave open 
alternative channels of communication.246  This framework is crucial to the 
merits of the various proposed approaches to street harassment. 
Consistent with that basic rule, certain categories of speech have been 
found generally excluded from First Amendment protection.  Miller v. 
California created a community-based test for defining obscenity, allowing 
states to regulate certain forms of extremely offensive speech.247  Chaplinsky 
v. New Hampshire recognized the so-called “fighting words” doctrine, 
allowing states to prohibit a narrow category of abusive language likely to 
contribute to a breach of the peace.248  As the Chaplinsky Court noted, “such 
utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such 
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from 
them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”249  In 
Cohen v. California, the Court narrowed this test, clarifying that it applied 
only to personal insults expressed to their target face-to-face, thereby 
excluding communications that contribute to public discourse.250 
Relatedly, the “true threats” doctrine excludes threats against another 
person from the purview of the First Amendment.251  The Supreme Court, 
though, has yet to fully settle whether, for constitutional purposes, a “true” 
threat need be defined subjectively—based on the intent of the defendant—
or whether it is constitutionally permissible to punish someone for speech 
that would be objectively threatening by the standards of a reasonable person, 
in the absence of proof of intent.252 
Beyond these categories, the First Amendment has not been held to bar 
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regulations in cases where speech is deeply intertwined with physical action, 
such as under the laws of assault (discussed in detail in Section C.3, infra). 
Similarly, the federal Civil Rights Act of 1968253 and the Matthew Shepard 
and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act together allow federal 
prosecutors to charge defendants who injure or intimidate victims based on 
race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation.254  Such hate crimes laws have 
resisted First Amendment scrutiny as they punish bias-motivated conduct—
including threats—as opposed to purely thoughts or words.255  Finally, 
private suits for torts such as intentional infliction of emotional distress, libel, 
slander, and the like do not generally run afoul of the First Amendment when 
brought by private figures.256  The Supreme Court has, however, required that 
“public” figures prove actual malice on the part of the defendant, in order to 
protect political speech and satire.257 
This quick overview highlights a couple of features of First Amendment 
jurisprudence relevant to the various legal options for combatting street 
harassment.  Roughly speaking, there is leeway for punishing threatening or 
genuinely dangerous behavior, particularly when directed at an individual, in 
the absence of a broader political message.  Yet speech falling short of these 
categories may be protected from blanket exclusion.  Against this backdrop, 
I now consider several of the means by which street harassment might be 
regulated. 
1. Blanket Statutory Bans on Street Harassment 
Many critics of street harassment have argued that jurisdictions should 
draft new legislation specifically targeting street harassment as a distinct 
practice.258  Currently, only one U.S. city, Kansas City, Missouri, has such 
 
253  Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 74–75 (2013). 
254  Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835, 2835 (2009). 
255  Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993). 
256  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
257  Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988).  See also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 
U.S. 443, 458–59 (2011) (holding that speech on a public sidewalk, about a public issue, 
cannot be liable under an intentional infliction of emotional distress theory, even when the 
speech is “outrageous”).  The Court has not provided precise guidance on the definition of 
“public figure.”  See Kate M. Adams, (Re)defining Public Officials and Public Figures: A 
Washington State Primer, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1155, 1155–56 (2000).  The touchstone 
appears to be whether an individual is involved in public affairs, as opposed to simply 
involved in issues of public interest.  See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454–55 
(1976) (holding for that reason that the wife of a wealthy businessman did not qualify as a 
public figure requiring proof of actual malice). 
258  See, e.g., HOLLABACK!, http://www.ihollaback.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2017); Street 
Harassment, ROGERS PARK YOUNG WOMEN’S ACTION TEAM, http://www.rogersparkywat. 
org/street-harassment/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2017); STOP STREET HARASSMENT, 
http://stopstreetharassment.org/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2017); Creating Safe Public Spaces, UN 
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an ordinance, which makes it a crime to engage in behavior meant to threaten 
or intimidate cyclists, pedestrians, and wheelchair users.259  The statute 
prohibits not only threats but also lower-level behavior such as honking, 
shouting, or “otherwise directing rude or unusual sounds” toward a victim.  
However, it also includes the specific intent requirement that the perpetrator 
have “the purpose of intimidating or injuring” the victim.260  For that reason, 
proponents of broader “Safe Spaces” legislation argue that even the sui 
generis Kansas City provision fails to capture much behavior that is actually 
harmful toward women.261  Such scholars urge that new legislation targeting 
street harassment should exclude specific intent requirements and require 
only that the harasser intend to engage in the conduct itself.262 
The problem, of course, is that in the absence of an intent requirement 
it is difficult to draft a workable definition of street harassment that turns on 
anything other than the content of the speech itself, thereby running afoul of 
current First Amendment requirements.  Bowman has argued that street 
harassment is analogous to workplace sexual harassment prohibitions, upheld 
as falling into the “captive audience” exception to the First Amendment.263  
Yet she acknowledges that the Supreme Court might strike down street 
harassment legislation under its decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, which 
declared unconstitutional a hate crimes ordinance that prohibited symbolic 
expression “one knows or has reason to know arouses anger, alarm or 
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, religion or gender.”264 
In R.A.V., the Court held that, while the city could outlaw all “fighting 
words,” it could not “regulate use based on hostility—or favoritism—towards 
the underlying message expressed.”265  If it is to avoid requiring the state to 
prove a threatening purpose, any workable definition of street harassment 
would seem to turn on whether the offending speech aroused gender-specific 
feelings of sexual or bodily discomfort, which would fall exactly into the 
category of content-based speech protected by R.A.V.  The alternative, 
banning all speech—or even all objectively upsetting speech—to strangers in 
public places, would be content neutral but patently absurd. 
 
WOMEN, http://unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/ending-violence-against-women/creating-safe-
public-spaces (last visited Jan. 20, 2016). 
259  Kan. City, Mo., Ordinances ch. 50, art. VI, § 50-205 (2014), available at 
https://library.municode.com/mo/kansas_city/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=COORKA
MIVOII_CH50OFMIPR_ARTVIOFAGPUSA_S50-205HABIPEWHOP. 
260  Id. 
261  See, e.g., Roenius supra note 225, at 833. 
262  Id. at 859. See also Bowman, supra note 219, at 574. 
263  Bowman, supra note 219, at 544.  
264  Id. at 546 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992)). 
265  Id. at 546–47 (quoting R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377).  
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Sopen Shah has argued that the most promising way around these 
obstacles to statutory innovation may be the yet-underdeveloped “true 
threats” doctrine.266  The Supreme Court has justified the “true threats” 
exception as necessary “to protect[] individuals from the fear of violence” 
and to prevent “the disruption that this fear engenders.”267  Shah concludes 
that because fear is a reasonable, near-universal reaction to street harassment, 
recognizing it as a true threat would be consistent with the purposes of the 
exception.268  Unfortunately, because the Court has declined to determine 
whether subjective intent to threaten is a necessary requirement for states to 
punish such conduct, the doctrine leaves any potential prohibition vulnerable 
if it lacks a subjective intent element.  There is currently a circuit split on the 
question.269 
Finally, some states in fact punish speech under the “fighting words” 
exception, for conduct tending to incite a breach of the peace in violation of 
prohibitions sometimes known as “dueling statutes.”270  Yet such statutes do 
not serve the same function as a general street harassment statute, as they 
focus not on the harasser’s conduct but on the victim’s likely reactions to it.  
Consistent with the stated purpose of the exception in Chaplinsky, the 
question is whether the victim would be likely moved to violence by the 
speech; as Bowman observes, even if we focus on the emotional distress 
caused by fighting words, other than a purpose of keeping the peace, “the 
assumption that outrage and injury is proved by evidence of violent reaction 
simply does not fit women’s typical response to psychic injury.”271 
Thus, the logic upon which courts reconcile fighting words statutes with 
the First Amendment does not provide much traction for drafting a street 
harassment prohibition. 
2. Existing Harassment Statutes 
While street harassment is a sui generis context which the vast majority 
of jurisdictions have not addressed, a number of states and municipalities do 
 
266  Sopen B. Shah, Open Season: Street Harassment as True Threats, 18 U. PA. J. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 377, 392–93 (2016). 
267  Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003). 
268  Shah, supra note 266, at 394. 
269  Id. at 395. 
270  See, e.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-39-1 (2010) (criminalizing “[e]very person who 
shall challenge another to fight a duel, or who shall send, deliver, or cause to be delivered, 
any written or verbal message purporting or intended to be such challenge”); see also Calvert 
Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033, 
1054 (1936). 
271  Bowman, supra note 219, at 561. 
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criminalize harassment in a public place.272  For example, Colorado’s 
harassment statute, which is representative, states: 
A person commits harassment if, with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm another person, 
he or she: 
(a) Strikes, shoves, kicks, or otherwise touches a person or subjects him to physical 
contact; or 
(b) In a public place directs obscene language or makes an obscene gesture to or at 
another person; or 
(c) Follows a person in or about a public place; or 
. . . 
(g) Makes repeated communications at inconvenient hours that invade the privacy of 
another and interfere in the use and enjoyment of another’s home or private residence 
or other private property; or 
(h) Repeatedly insults, taunts, challenges, or makes communications in offensively 
coarse language to, another in a manner likely to provoke a violent or disorderly 
response.273 
While some of these theories of liability initially seem applicable to 
street harassment, they contain various requirements, common to other 
states’ versions, which make them ill-suited to capturing much relevant 
conduct of street harassers.274  Their reach is limited by 1) the requirement of 
specific intent to harass; 2) the requirement, under most sub-sections, that the 
offending behavior be repetitive; and 3) in sub-section (b), the requirement 
that the content of the language meet the very high constitutional threshold 
of obscenity.  Furthermore, in a review of the case law construing such 
statutes, Bowman notes that—while they almost certainly could be applied 
to at least some forms of street harassment—few convictions have been 
upheld, in part due to stated judicial reluctance to construe them so as to 
criminalize behavior that is so common.275 
It is clear that the attempt to punish street harassment as harassment has 
been unfruitful within the framework of the First Amendment.  And, while 
tort liability offers some options for victims to seek redress as individuals,276 
 
272  See ALASKA STAT. § 11.61.1210 (2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-208 (2013); COLO. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111 (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 1311 (2007); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 711-1106 (LexisNexis 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:4 (LexisNexis 
2007); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2C:33-4 (West 2005); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.25 (McKinney 2017); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 166.065 (2013). 
273  COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-111. 
274  See Bowman, supra note 219, at 556. 
275  Id. at 558. 
276  See Maeve Olney, Note, Toward a Socially Responsible Application of the Criminal 
Law to the Problem of Street Harassment, 22 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 129, 150–51 
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it does not serve the same expressive function as the criminal law, as 
discussed in Part III.  Part IV will develop a workable proposal for 
prosecuting street harassment, instead, as simple assault, and will explore the 
potential Broken Windows effects of such enforcement on the more serious 
problem of sexual assault. 
IV. COMBATTING SEXUAL ASSAULT THROUGH STREET HARASSMENT 
ENFORCEMENT 
Thus far, this article has identified two separate but related problems in 
criminal justice: the expressive crisis in rape law and the lesser but significant 
problem of rampant, yet largely legal, street harassment.  In this Part, I argue 
that prosecutors should turn their attention to street harassment in cases 
where it violates existing laws.  Not only can they do so constitutionally, but 
in doing so they will, over time, prevent more serious, harder-to-prove crimes 
of sexual assault. 
A. STREET HARASSMENT AS ASSAULT 
A person is typically guilty of assault when, “without lawful authority, 
he or she knowingly engages in conduct which places another in reasonable 
apprehension of receiving a battery.”277  As the definition of a battery 
includes “physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature,” it is clear that 
the offence can include threatened, but uncompleted, physical contact short 
of actual violence.278  Some states, such as New York, have narrowed that 
common law understanding to require a showing of physical injury.279  Yet 
such states generally penalize attempted unwanted touching under related 
offenses such as menacing280 or attempted forcible touching.281  Furthermore, 
all states but Mississippi and Idaho282 criminalize groping (and its attempt) 
as a form of sexual or indecent assault.283  In short, through one or another 
theory of assault, attempted assault, or attempted sexual assault, street 
harassment violates these existing criminal laws on the occasions where the 
perpetrator has the intent to touch or to put his victim in immediate 
apprehension of unwanted touching. 
 
(2015) (discussing the availability of tort remedies under theories of invasion of privacy, 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault). 
277  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-1 (2012). 
278  720 ILL. COMP. STAT. STAT. 5/12-3. 
279  N.Y. PENAL LAW 120.00(1) (2008). 
280  Oregon Rev. STAT. § 2903.22 (2013). 
281  N.Y. PENAL LAW 130.52 (2014). 
282  Emily Shugerman, Two U.S. States Don’t Count Groping as a Crime, REVELIST 
(Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.revelist.com/politics/legal-groping-united-states/6262. 
283  See, e.g., 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3126 (West 2010). 
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While this admittedly captures only particularly egregious examples of 
street harassment, it escapes the First Amendment problems that would arise 
with a statute targeting harassment qua harassment: when accompanied by a 
threat of physical contact harassment is no longer in the sphere of pure 
speech.  Indeed, prosecutors do, in some cases, already pursue the worst 
forms of public groping, at least when there’s public demand.  For example, 
Washington, D.C. photographer Liz Gorman prompted public outrage at the 
so-called Dupont Circle “bicycle groper,” who, after assaulting her, became 
the target of an unusually thorough investigation and was ultimately 
apprehended and convicted of four counts of sexual abuse.284  Credit for that 
conviction goes to the police who spent many hours conducting witness 
interviews and reviewing security footage, as well as to Gorman herself who, 
having failed to chase her assailant down, called the police and wrote a blog 
post that stirred up an outpouring of public response and new reports from 
subsequent victims.285 
Yet critics have pointed out that such prosecutions have been few and 
far between for a number of reasons. 286  Two are substantive: the need to 
prove the defendant’s intent to put the victim in apprehension of touching 
and the reciprocal requirement that the victim’s fear of touching be 
objectively reasonable.287  Certainly, even setting aside First Amendment 
concerns, these difficulties are insurmountable in the vast majority of “hey 
baby” situations, where the words alone do not trigger an apprehension of 
touching but merely awareness of being observed.  And they are, of course, 
easily met (and irrelevant) in cases where actual groping occurs. 
The difficult cases are in the middle ground.  Suppose a man steps out 
of the shadows while a woman is walking alone at night, moves aggressively 
close to fall into step alongside her and hisses in her ear “I would fuck you 
right now if I could.”  One could argue that the harasser’s use of the 
subjunctive tense evinces a lack of intent to follow through on the assault.  
But at the same time, the speed with which he darted into the victim’s 
personal space, the surprise element, the darkness, the intimations of barely 
suppressed sexual violence all suggest beyond a reasonable doubt that he had 
 
284  Peter Hermann, Bicycle Groper Pleads Guilty to August Attacks in Dupont Circle, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/bicycle-groper-
pleads-guilty-to-august-attacks-in-dupont-circle/2012/11/08/7a06d34c-29f7-11e2-b4e0-
346287b7e56c_story.html?utm_term=.25e6f8229a1d. 
285  Petula Dvorak, Dupont Circle Bicycle Groper Committed a Crime, not a 
Misdemeanor, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dupont-
circle-bicycle-groper-committed-a-crime-not-a-misdemeanor/2012/08/30/5febf118-f2de-
11e1-adc6-87dfa8eff430_story.html?tid=a_inl&utm_term=.7f7b82b93013. 
286  See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 219, at 549. 
287  Id. 
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at least knowledge that his behavior would put the victim in apprehension of 
at least some form of unwanted touching.  It is a basic principle of evidence 
law that a factfinder may infer intent from a defendant’s actions.288  For 
example, if the accused puts a gun to someone’s head and pulls the trigger, it 
is hardly problematic to find him guilty of murder without delving deep into 
his psyche to prove mens rea.  When verbal street harassment is accompanied 
by sudden physical movements, an element of surprise, and intimations of 
real violence, fact-finders should be allowed similar inferences. 
As to the element of the victim’s reasonableness, Cynthia Bowman 
points out that the use of the “reasonable man” standard can thwart liability 
due to the fact that male judges and lawyers do not see street harassment as 
objectively intimidating.289  She is quite correct that “because of her constant 
awareness of the violent consequences of male hostility to women and her 
realistic fears of rape” even though “only a minority of harassment incidents 
may lead to an ‘offensive touching,’ a reasonable woman cannot know which 
will be the one.”290  Therefore, the attempt to use existing assault laws to 
prosecute street harassment must be accompanied by both prosecutorial and 
judicial awareness and appropriate jury instructions to the effect that 
“reasonableness” include the general circumstances of both halves of the 
population.291 
With greater attention to how women may experience aggressive street 
harassment, even short of physical touching, prosecutors can and should 
bring many more charges against perpetrators of this middle category.  
Setting aside broader Broken Windows effects, which the next two sections 
discuss, the law of assault provides a limited, constitutional ground of 
liability for the very real social, psychological, cultural, and physical injuries 
street harassers impose on their victims and society in general.  By ignoring 
these injuries, prosecutors fail to protect the public interest in their charge. 
Obviously, in a world of plea bargains and limited prosecutorial 
resources, the charging decision drives who and what the justice system 
 
288  See, e.g., United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 197 (2d Cir. 2002) (approving jury 
instruction allowing inference that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of 
his actions). 
289  Bowman, supra note 219, at 553. 
290  Id. 
291  For a discussion of the gender implications of objective reasonableness standards in 
the law, see Margo Schlanger, Gender Matters: Teaching A Reasonable Woman Standard in 
Personal Injury Law, 45 ST. LOUIS L.J. 769, 769 (2001) (noting that “one very standard 
doctrinal move is to conceptualize reasonable care as that care shown by a ‘reasonable 
person’ under like circumstances” and noting the paucity of case law taking into account 
whether and how a reasonable man might differ from a reasonable woman). 
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actually criminalizes.292  Expansive criminal codes give prosecutors massive 
discretionary leeway, some of which they use at the macro to distinguish 
“real” crimes as enforcement priorities, in contrast to “technical” crimes.293  
To the extent that prosecutors take assault seriously as a crime, it is crucial 
that they come to recognize assaultive street harassment as part of that 
category of offenses, and prioritize it along with other crimes against the 
body. 
The literature on prosecutorial discretion suggests that charging 
decisions often turn on such case-by-case factors as the defendant’s prior 
record, the level of violence involved, and the intimacy between the 
defendant and the accused (the last of which has been shown to cut against 
enforcement).294  Other structural factors affecting charging decisions include 
“perceived inconsistency between the law’s requirements and common sense 
notions of justice” and “uncertainty regarding the impact of criminal 
prosecutions on crime rates.”295  In considering how to apply the law with 
“common sense,” prosecutors may in fact invoke “stereotypes or common 
sense assumptions about crime and criminals that lead them to focus on some 
offenses and offenders more than others.”296  To the extent that community 
stereotypes about street harassment being harmless fun, or women inviting it 
due to attire or geography, affect charging decisions in these cases, 
prosecutors must seek to avoid them.  Even the understanding of what 
constitutes “violence” for charging purposes could be improved by increased 
education about the nature and harms of street harassment. 
Obviously, one of the most important criteria prosecutors use to 
determine whether a case will move forward is the likelihood of 
conviction.297  Prosecutors’ offices have formal charging policies, which 
generally list likelihood of conviction as a significant factor in deciding how 
 
292  See generally Bibas, supra note 119 (discussing the role of prosecutorial discretion in 
charging). 
293  See VERA INST. JUST., FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND DISPOSITION IN 
NEW YORK CITY’S COURTS xiii (rev. ed. 1981). 
294  See W. BOYD LITTRELL, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: POLICE, PROSECUTORS, AND PLEA 
BARGAINING 129–41 (1979); VERA INST. JUST., supra note 293, at 133; Kay L. Levine, The 
Intimacy Discount: Prosecutorial Discretion, Privacy, and Equality in the Statutory Rape 
Caseload, 53 EMORY L.J. 691, 692–93 (2006).  
295  Levine, supra note 294, at 698. 
296  Myra Dawson, Rethinking the Boundaries of Intimacy at the End of the Century: The 
Role of Victim-Defendant Relationship in Criminal Justice Decisionm aking Over Time, 38 L. 
& SOC’Y REV. 105, 106 (2004).  
297  Celesta Albonetti, Prosecutorial Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 L. & 
SOC’Y REV. 291, 311 (1982). 
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to wield discretion and resources.298  Indeed, sociologist Lisa Frohmann has 
found that prosecutors justify charging decisions based on predictions about 
whether juries will empathize with the victim.299  Yet, as Frohmann suggests, 
and as I discussed in the context of general sexual assault in Part I, when 
prosecutors act based on these predictions, they are only reinforcing 
stereotypes about gender-appropriate behavior and creating a class of people 
who go under-protected.300  Indeed, the ABA’s standards for criminal justice 
explicitly state that a prosecutor should give no weight, in charging, to his or 
her own record of conviction. 
It may well be the case that assault-based street harassment convictions 
are challenging, for both the doctrinal and cultural reasons discussed above.  
Yet prosecutors can and should use their discretion to combat the very 
stereotypes that result in so much explicit and symbolic sexual violence 
against women.  And in any case, “charging policies tend to have little impact 
on case-specific evaluations” but, rather, focus on offense categories 
generally.301  As assault is a non-controversially significant offense category, 
my proposal does not likely run afoul of charging polices, any more than it 
does the First Amendment. 
In addition to simply enforcing the laws of assault against assaultive 
street harassment, prosecutors should engage in some kind of outreach to 
advertise that fact.  The D.C. bicycle groper was a perfect example of how 
public outreach, by both the victim and the D.C. Metro Police, resulted in 
more evidence: four new victims spoke out after Gorman’s blog post was 
circulated and it became clear that the police were taking her allegations 
seriously.302  While many episodes of assaultive street harassment occur so 
quickly that they are difficult to report, if victims believe there is a point in 
reporting, they will be more likely to do so, and the general public can assist 
where appropriate.303 
This Section has demonstrated that not only is it possible, doctrinally 
 
298  Kenneth J. Mellili, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 BYU L. 
REV. 669, 684. 
299  Lisa Frohmann, Convictability and Discordant Locales: Reproducing Race, Class, 
and Gender Ideologies in Prosecutorial Decisionmaking, 31 L. & SOC’Y REV. 531, 536 
(1997).  
300  Id.  
301  Mellili, supra note 298, at 683. 
302  Dvorak, supra note 285.  
303  In a recent New Yorker article, Syracuse University Professor Mary Karr describes 
how she was nearly deterred from reporting a man who had grabbed her crotch in broad 
daylight on a New York City street by the potential futility, but how after overcoming those 
concerns, she succeeded in getting him arrested.  Mary Karr, The Crotchgrabber, NEW 
YORKER (Aug. 11, 2016), http://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/the-
crotchgrabber. 
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and pragmatically, to use existing laws to pursue the most severe cases of 
street harassment, but also that there are important reasons for doing so.  The 
most important reason, however, relates to the factor of violence in 
influencing charging decisions.  While episodes like the ones described in 
this Section do not involve physical injury or high-level violence, they are 
significant due to their relationship to more extreme forms of violence.  In 
the following Sections, I will argue that prosecutors should take into account 
the likely Broken Windows effect of charging assaultive street harassers on 
the most severe forms of sexual violence against women. 
B. THE STRONG BROKEN WINDOWS EFFECT 
As discussed in Part II, the empirical literature on Broken Windows 
policing remains mixed.  Yet at least some research suggests it does indeed 
have what I will refer to as the “strong” effect: in some cases enforcing laws 
against lower-level crimes appears to modestly but statistically significantly 
reduce more serious offenses.304  Most significantly, Anthony Braga and 
Brenda Bond found such positive effects to be correlated with community 
involvement in policing, emphasizing the need for a “tradition of stable 
relationships [between the police and] the community and responsiveness to 
local concerns.”305 
If Broken Windows can even modestly reduce violent crime through 
targeting completely unrelated misdemeanors, it stands to reason that it could 
be even more powerful at reducing serious sex crimes when applied to lower 
level sexually based offenses like assaultive street harassment.  Both from 
the perspective of victims (for whom street harassment is the regular 
manifestation of fears about more serious sexual assault) and perpetrators, 
who participate in, and are emboldened by, the same culture of physical 
sexual violation as rapists, the two categories of conduct go hand in hand.  
The victims’ perspective is not simply relevant symbolically: we know that 
many victims decide not to report sexual assault due to a fear that the justice 
system will not help them.306  It stands to reason that the state cracking down 
on assaultive street harassment will serve a pragmatic expressive purpose, as 
evidence that the system does care about punishing sexual violations.  And 
to the extent that Broken Windows theory works best where the police and 
community cooperate with one another, the public nature of street harassment 
is a ripe context for such cooperation. 
Furthermore, pursuing street harassment may be much easier, from an 
 
304  See supra notes 144–156 and accompanying text. 
305  Braga & Bond, supra note 166, at 600. 
306  See supra Section I.D; see also supra notes 17–19. 
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evidentiary standpoint, than pursuing sexual assault.  Many sexual assaults 
occur behind closed doors, which poses evidentiary challenges for 
prosecutors and factfinders, who must ensure that the standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt is met.  Even if the system works harder, as it 
should, to aggressively pursue sexual assault cases in the face of various 
cultural rape myths, there will necessarily be fewer convictions than 
warranted.  Street assault occurs in broad daylight, often in situations with 
many witnesses.  It does not involve expensive DNA evidence and, because 
it is nearly always between strangers, presents few if any defenses that the 
victim consented to the assault.  While the problem of under-reporting is 
likely as big or bigger than in rape cases, prosecutors and police can combat 
that through greater public outreach.  In sum, assaultive street harassment is 
low-hanging fruit.  If the strong version of Broken Windows theory is correct, 
and there are good reasons to believe it might be in this context, we can 
reduce rape and more extreme versions of sexual assault by targeting this 
behavior when it meets the legal definition of assault. 
C. THE WEAK BROKEN WINDOWS EFFECT 
Let us assume for a moment that the strong version of Broken Windows 
is ineffective.  Perhaps all we get by punishing broken windows is fewer 
broken windows.  Even then, that “aesthetic” effect is uniquely important and 
effective in cases of sexual assault.  As discussed in Section I.B, the 
substantive definition of sexual assault is in transition.  There is growing 
social and psychological awareness that a mere lack of physical force does 
not render sex consensual, due to the many reasons a woman might have for 
failing to physically resist.  Yet the literature suggests that neither 
enforcement nor popular belief has caught up to this understanding.  Rape 
mythology persists and charging decisions and jury verdicts replicate it.  To 
use Adam Samaha’s “clock” model of policy-making, we can say that when 
it comes to the definition of sexual assault, we lack a stable, shared meaning 
for the term “noon.”  As a society, we need to come to a shared formal 
understanding that tracks with the reality of how rape truly occurs.  We need 
a “clock” that tells would-be perpetrators that their default posture should be 
to leave a woman alone. 
Given the expressive crisis surrounding sexual assault enforcement, 
aggressively prosecuting assaultive street harassment will have the Broken 
Windows effect Samaha attributes to the clock: it will serve as an aesthetic 
mechanism for coordinating the minds of all of the citizens to create the 
relevant reality.307  We need a reality in which a woman’s body and sexual 
 
307  Samaha, supra note 144, at 1584–85.  
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identity are not considered a resource for the male population unless they 
explicitly say otherwise.  And we need substantive legal definitions of rape, 
enforcement patterns, and jury verdicts to reflect this unitary reality.  In short, 
enforcing assault laws to create a legal reality of presumed bodily freedom 
from assaultive harassment at the street level will contribute to more stable 
definitions of assault and consent systemically.  In addition to the benefits for 
actual prosecution of rapists, such a policy would reduce the expressive 
failures that have led many women to feel alienated and unprotected by our 
laws. 
That said, there is a secondary expressive benefit to this sort of Broken 
Windows effect.  In Section II.C, I explored the ways in which widespread 
condemnation of “rape culture” has been a double-edged sword.  Defining so 
much of male conduct as rape-supportive risks creating a black and white 
dichotomy in public discourse between either denying that rape culture exists 
at all or branding anything and everything as part of it at a cost to actual crime 
victims.308  It has also, as mentioned, created a cultural narrative about 
campus rape that may not only compromise notions of due process in those 
cases but de-emphasize the more pervasive problem outside of campuses.309 
Should prosecutors begin to charge street harassment as assault, they 
would serve a useful secondary expressive function: applying the law with 
precision to designate the most troubling conduct as illegal.  The proposals 
for new legislation specifically targeting harassment not only run afoul of the 
First Amendment but also risk further intensifying the polarized cultural 
debate over acceptable male behavior.  Indeed, female respondents to at least 
one 2000 study generally opposed straightforward legislation against speech-
based street harassment on a number of grounds, including concerns for their 
own autonomy, should the state step in to defend them against such a 
common problem.310  An assault-based approach holds the promise of 
common ground, and of workable, fixed rules that can combat antiquated 
beliefs about female sexual availability without entering the domain of witch 
hunts, gender wars, or excessive state intrusion into cultural life. 
 
308  James Hamblin makes this point nicely, noting “incendiary as reactions on the topic 
can be, though, at least some of the polarization is media spectacle.  Ultimately, everyone 
wants the same thing: no rape.  Positing choices between prosecuting rapists or fixing 
systems and realigning expectations, between the rights of one gender and the other, thwarts 
progress.”  James Hamblin, How Not to Talk About the Culture of Sexual Assault, ATLANTIC 
(Mar. 29, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/03/how-not-to-talk-about-
the-culture-of-sexual-assault/359845/.  
309  See Volokh, supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
310  Laura Beth Nielsen, Situating Legal Consciousness: Experiences and Attitudes of 
Ordinary Citizens about Law and Street Harassment, 34 L. & SOC’Y REV. 1055, 1076–80 
(2000). 
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D. POTENTIAL CONCERNS FOR APPLICATION 
I have already addressed many of the common arguments against 
prosecuting street harassment in and of itself.311  And I have reviewed the 
empirical criticism of Broken Windows as an enforcement practice generally 
and argued that, even if the staunchest critics are correct, it nonetheless holds 
unique promise in the sexual assault context.312  Yet applying Broken 
Windows in the specific manner I suggest may attract a few additional 
objections. 
Most importantly, the specter of race-based enforcement—already well-
documented in current Broken Windows policing313—may be even more of 
a problem when we use it to address such a ubiquitous form of behavior, 
particularly in urban spaces.  As William Stuntz has observed of vice crimes, 
due to the impossibility of policing all qualifying behavior, the decision to 
investigate is the primary determinant of who gets punished.314  It cannot be 
emphasized enough that any effort to operationalize this proposal must be 
accompanied by additional scrutiny to ensure even-handed enforcement.  
And the proposed limitation on enforcement to only those cases that meet the 
elements of assault—as opposed to adopting a generalized harassment statute 
—goes a long way toward limiting illegitimate discretion.315  Furthermore, 
unlike drug use, prostitution, sodomy, or other offenses that have, in the past, 
been only selectively enforced to target either certain individuals or groups, 
street harassment has both a victim and, usually, third-party witnesses.  The 
need for these actors’ involvement before an investigation can even take 
place is another important limit on police and prosecutorial abuse. 
Furthermore, street harassment—due in part to its very ubiquity—tracks 
somewhat less with socio-economic conditions than other misdemeanor 
offenses like vandalism and petty theft.316  Critics of the now-famous 
“Hollaback!” video made by filmmaker Bob Bliss point out the racially 
fraught implications of the fact that he documented ten hours of primarily 
minority men harassing a white woman, suggesting that the moment of 
feminist backlash against such conduct was motivated by implicit racism or 
 
311  See supra Section IV.A. 
312  See supra Section II.A–C. 
313  See e.g., Fagan & Garth, supra note 173.  
314  See William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1875 (2000); see 
also Irina D. Manta, The High Cost of Low Sanctions, 66 FLA. L. REV. 157, 159 (2014) 
(arguing that selective media reporting of uniquely high sanctions against particular 
defendants may distort public perceptions of enforcement regimes by shifting attention away 
from smaller, but unjust, sanctions against a greater number of others). 
315  See discussion at Section IV.B, supra.  
316  See Bowman, supra note 219, at 531.  
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classism.317  But evidence suggests that street harassment is a problem that 
transcends class and race.  In a 1984 study, sociologists Cheryl Benard and 
Edit Schlaffer, acting as their own guinea pigs on the streets, reported that 
age, education, and income bore little relation to harassing behavior 
(although younger men tended to be more aggressive, and older men tended 
to lower their voices).318  And, indeed, the Office of Civil Rights’ campaign 
against campus sexual assault is only a part of a generalized campaign against 
sexual harassment.319  Whatever the constitutional merits of OCR’s approach 
to combatting the problem, its involvement has clearly emphasized that 
young, educated men form a high-priority part of it.  Because street 
harassment occurs anywhere and everywhere320—as does the sexual assault 
this article’s theory of Broken Windows targets—it can and should be 
enforceable in a racially just manner. 
CONCLUSION 
On January 21, 2017, the day after Donald Trump’s inauguration, 
hundreds of thousands of protesters gathered to participate in the Women’s 
March in Washington, D.C.321 While the gathering—joined by parallel 
demonstrations in most major U.S. cities and around the world—was a 
widespread reaction to many values already expressed by the then-President-
elect, the women’s rights focus of the March originated with his casual boast 
that when “you’re a star,” you can “do anything” to women, even “grab them 
by the pussy.”322  In a world where a candidate for President of the United 
States gets elected after openly endorsing sexual assault, and in doing so 
galvanizes the largest day of protests in U.S. history, it is unsurprising that 
every aspect of sexual assault enforcement is at an expressive crossroads. 
 
317  Kay Himowitz, Street Harassment Isn’t About Sexism—It’s About Privilege, TIME 
(Nov. 4, 2014), http://time.com/3556523/street-harassment-isnt-about-sexism-its-about-
privilege/. 
318  Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg, The Man in the Street: Why He Harasses, 
in FEMINIST FRAMEWORKS: ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL ACCOUNTS OF THE RELATIONS 
BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN 70, 72 (Alison M. Jaggar & Paula S. Rothenberg eds., 2d ed. 
1984).  See also Carol B. Gardner, Passing By: Street Remarks, Address Rights, and the 
Urban Female, 50 SOC. INQUIRY 328, 333 (1980). 
319  Off. of the Assistant Secretary, Dear Colleague Letter, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. (Apr. 4, 
2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-201104.html.  
320  See Georgina Rannard & Will Dahlgreen, 100 Women 2016: A Weekend of Street 
Harassment Mapped, BBC NEWS (Dec. 9, 2106), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-
38236694.  
321  Erica Chenoweth & Jeremy Pressman, This is What We Learned By Counting the 
Women’s Marches, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
monkey-cage/wp/2017/02/07/this-is-what-we-learned-by-counting-the-womens-
marches/?utm_term=.1cd49209b6b0.  
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This article provides a moderate proposal to decrease sexual assault by 
applying the lessons learned from Broken Windows policing to the related 
problem of assaultive street harassment.  Due to the cyclical relationship 
between appearance and reality, which appears to contribute to rapes being 
under-reported, under-investigated, and under-prosecuted, it is clear that the 
criminal justice system is failing at its expressive functions, with significant 
consequences for substantive justice.  If the “strong” view of Broken 
Windows works, then by targeting street harassment as assault we can reduce 
much harder-to-prove sexual assaults over time.  Yet even if only the “weak” 
view of Broken Windows applies, we can still make substantial strides 
towards resolving the expressive crisis over the definitions of sexual assault 
and consent.  Such enforcement would disrupt the cultural norm of default 
male access to female bodies in a manner less polarizing than that of the 
current extra-legal critique of “rape culture.”  In either case, it would also 
encourage more victims to report sexual assaults of all varieties by expressing 
that the state cares about prosecuting sex offenses.  All of these effects would 
serve, directly or indirectly, to reduce the incidence of sexual assault.  Either 
way, prosecutors and courts need to think about the big-picture relationship 
between street harassment and sexual assault and enforce existing laws with 
an eye toward this connection. 
 
 
